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This dissertation focuses on the behavioral economics of individual decision making and 
consists of three separate essays. In Chapter 1, I use a laboratory experiment to compare three 
popular point-of-sale solicitation methods: a fixed donation request (yes or no to a randomly 
assigned amount); a rounding request (yes or no to an endogenous amount); and an open-ended 
solicitation. Further, I examine the effects of providing (limited) information on the charity. In 
Chapter 2, I study key aspects of fundraising campaigns that utilize goals or provision points that 
must be met in order to provide a good or service. I use a laboratory experiment to compare 
campaigns characterized by a final goal only, an intermediate goal and a known final goal, and a 
third setting where the final goal is known only if the intermediate goal is reached. Across these 
three settings, I vary whether an individual’s payoff from reaching a goal is uncertain or certain, 
which is intended to capture the effects of providing vague or precise information on the good or 
service to be provided. In Chapter 3, I examine the effects of officer-involved fatalities, 
including officer-involved shootings, on domestic violence reporting. I conduct this analysis 
using county and zip code level data to understand how concentrated any effects of police 
violence may be. Using within-county variation, I test whether the number of domestic violence 




Table of Contents 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Checking Out Checkout Charity: A Study of Point-of-Sale Donation Campaigns ...... 3 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 5 
Model .......................................................................................................................................... 9 
Experimental Design ................................................................................................................. 15 
Hypotheses ................................................................................................................................ 17 
Experimental Methods .............................................................................................................. 19 
Results ........................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Motives ...................................................................................................................................... 33 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 34 
References ................................................................................................................................. 37 
Chapter 2: On the Design of Fundraising Campaigns: goal setting and information provision in 
dynamic fundraisers ...................................................................................................................... 39 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 40 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 41 
Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................. 46 
Experimental Design ................................................................................................................. 50 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 55 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 64 
References ................................................................................................................................. 67 
Chapter 3: The Impact of Police Violence on Domestic Violence Reporting .............................. 70 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 71 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 72 
Background ............................................................................................................................... 74 
Data ........................................................................................................................................... 78 
Estimation Strategy ................................................................................................................... 82 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 84 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 95 
References ................................................................................................................................. 97 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 100 
Appendices .................................................................................................................................. 102 
v 
Appendix A. ............................................................................................................................ 103 
Appendix B. ............................................................................................................................ 121 
Appendix C. ............................................................................................................................ 148 




List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Mechanisms by Treatment .......................................................................................... 103 
Table 1.2 Data Description ......................................................................................................... 104 
Table 1.3 Treatment Statistics..................................................................................................... 105 
Table 1.4 Analysis of donation rates........................................................................................... 106 
Table 1.5 Mechanism Comparison at Amounts under $1........................................................... 107 
Table 1.6 Loose-change Effects by Mechanism ......................................................................... 108 
Table 1.7 Analysis of Donation Amount by Treatment .............................................................. 109 
Table 1.8 Estimation of Willingness-to-Donate ......................................................................... 110 
Table 1.9 Tests of information effects ........................................................................................ 111 
Table 1.10 Information Effects on Donation Amount ................................................................ 112 
Table 1.11 Information Effects on Donation Rate ...................................................................... 113 
Table 1.12 Enjoyment ................................................................................................................. 114 
Table 2.1 Experimental Design ................................................................................................... 121 
Table 2.2 Goals by Treatment and Scenario ............................................................................... 122 
Table 2.3 Data Description ......................................................................................................... 123 
Table 2.4 Analysis of fundraising success: group contributions ................................................ 124 
Table 2.5 Analysis of fundraising success: group contributions, by goal structure ................... 125 
Table 2.6 Analysis of fundraising success: final goal ................................................................. 126 
Table 2.7 Analysis of fundraising success: final goal, by goal structure .................................... 127 
Table 2.8 Analysis of fundraising success: intermediate goal .................................................... 128 
Table 2.9 Analysis of fundraising success: intermediate goal, by goal structure ....................... 129 
Table 2.10 Variance in individual contributions, by treatment .................................................. 130 
Table 2.11 Variance in individual contributions, by goal structure ............................................ 131 
Table 3.1 Reported domestic violence incidents and county-level statistics .............................. 148 
Table 3.2 Reported Officer Involved Fatalities - TN .................................................................. 149 
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of 911 Calls for Service and Zip code Controls ....................... 150 
Table 3.4 Impact of Officer Involved Fatalities on Domestic Violence Reports per 1,000 
Residents ..................................................................................................................................... 151 
vii 
Table 3.4A Impact of Officer Involved Fatalities on Domestic Violence Reports Filed: Cause of 
Death - Gunshot .......................................................................................................................... 152 
Table 3.5 Impact of Officer Involved Fatalities on Domestic Violence Reports Filed – Less 
Treated Counties ......................................................................................................................... 153 
Table 3.6 7-day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence Calls ........................... 154 
Table 3.6A 3-day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence Calls ........................ 155 
Table 3.7 7-Day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls ................................................... 156 
Table 3.7A 3-Day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls ................................................ 157 
Table 3.8 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls ................................ 158 
Table 3.8A 2 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls ............................. 159 
Table 3.9 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls ............................................................... 160 
Table 3.9A 2 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls............................................................. 161 
Table 3.10 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls by Neighborhood. 162 
Table 3.10A 2 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls by Neighborhood
..................................................................................................................................................... 163 
Table 3.11 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls by Neighborhood ................................ 164 




List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Screen presented to subjects in the Fixed Request mechanism with no information 115 
Figure 1.2 Reasons for Donating ................................................................................................ 116 
Figure 1.3 Reasons for Not Donating ......................................................................................... 117 
Figure 1.4 Donation Rates by Mechanism .................................................................................. 118 
Figure 1.5 Reasons for Giving .................................................................................................... 119 
Figure 1.6 Reasons for Not Giving ............................................................................................. 120 
Figure 2.1. Final goal success rate, by treatment ........................................................................ 132 
Figure 2.2 Total group contributions, by treatment .................................................................... 133 
Figure 2.3 Mean Contributions across decision periods, by treatment ....................................... 134 
Figure 2.4 Mean Contributions across decision periods, by treatment ....................................... 135 
Figure 2.5 Time final goal reached by decision period .............................................................. 136 
Figure 2.6 Distribution of Time Final Goal is Reached ............................................................. 137 
Figure 2.7 Percent of Final Goal Reached within the 2-minute contribution window ............... 138 
Figure 2.8 Time Intermediate Goal Reached .............................................................................. 139 
Figure 3.1 Domestic Violence Incidents by Offense Type - Tennessee (2018) ......................... 166 
Figure 3.2 Domestic Violence Assaults by County .................................................................... 167 
Figure 3.3 Domestic Violence Simple Assaults by County ........................................................ 168 
Figure 3.4 Officer Involved Fatalities by County ....................................................................... 169 
Figure 3.5 14-day Event Study – Simple Assaults per 1000 residents ....................................... 170 
Figure 3.6 14-day Event Study – All Assaults – per 1000 residents .......................................... 171 
Figure 3.7 8-week Event Study – Simple Assault ...................................................................... 172 
Figure 3.8 8-week Event Study – All Assault............................................................................. 173 
Figure 3.9 Population by Zip Code – Memphis, TN .................................................................. 174 
Figure 3.10 911 Calls by Zip Code – Memphis, TN .................................................................. 175 
Figure 3.11 911 Domestic Violence Calls by Zip Code – Memphis, TN ................................... 176 
Figure 3.12 Percent of Residents Below Poverty Line – Memphis, TN ..................................... 177 
Figure 3.13 Percent of Residents Unemployed – Memphis, TN ................................................ 178 
Figure 3.14 Officer Involved Fatalities by Zip Code – Memphis, TN ....................................... 179 
ix 
Figure 3.15 Percent White by Zip Code – Memphis, TN ........................................................... 180 
Figure 3.16 14-Day Event Study – 911 Domestic Violence Calls ............................................. 181 
Figure 3.17 14-Day Event Study – 911 Calls ............................................................................. 182 
Figure 3.18 8-Week Event Study – Domestic Violence Calls .................................................... 183 
Figure 3.19 8-Week Event Study – 911 Calls............................................................................. 184 
Figure 3.A.1 3-Day Event Window – Simple Assaults per 1000 residents ................................ 185 








This dissertation focuses on the behavioral economics of individual decision making. In 
Chapter 1, I use a laboratory experiment to compare three popular point-of-sale solicitation 
methods: a fixed donation request (yes or no to a randomly assigned amount); a rounding request 
(yes or no to an endogenous amount); and an open-ended solicitation. Further, I examine the 
effects of providing (limited) information on the charity. I find that, at amounts less than $1, 
participants in the rounding treatments were much more likely to donate. Holding fixed the 
amount of the ask, differences in donation rates between the rounding and fixed request 
treatments appear to be driven by “loose-change effects,” whereby individuals are more likely to 
donate if they would have less change as a result. Participants in the fixed request treatments 
exhibited higher mean willingness-to-donate than those in the open-ended. Last, a one sentence 
information statement about the charity has positive but small effects on donation rates and 
amounts in the fixed request treatment. 
In Chapter 2, I study key aspects of fundraising campaigns that utilize goals or provision 
points that must be met in order to provide a good or service. I use a laboratory experiment to 
compare campaigns characterized by a final goal only, an intermediate goal and a known final 
goal, and a third setting where the final goal is known only if the intermediate goal is reached. 
Across these three settings, I vary whether an individual’s payoff from reaching a goal is 
uncertain or certain, which is intended to capture the effects of providing vague or precise 
information on the good or service to be provided. I find that the addition of an intermediate goal 
decreases the likelihood of reaching the final goal. Moreover, the level of the intermediate goal 
(holding payoffs for reaching the goal fixed) has no discernible effect on whether the 
2 
intermediate or final goal is reached. This suggests a possible strategy whereby the campaign 
designer includes a final goal as a decoy in order to reach the desired “intermediate” goal. Value 
uncertainty has a negative significant effect on the likelihood of reaching the goal when only one 
goal is present. Finally, goal uncertainty has a positive significant effect on contributions. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the effects of officer-involved fatalities, including officer-involved 
shootings, on domestic violence reporting. I conduct this analysis using county and zip code level 
data to understand how concentrated any effects of police violence may be. Using within-county 
variation, I test whether the number of domestic violence reports decreases in the week after a fatal 
officer-involved encounter. I find little to no effect of OIFs on domestic violence reporting at the 
county level. However, using zip code-level 911 call data from Memphis, TN, I find some evidence 
of decreased 911 calls for domestic violence in neighborhoods where an officer-involved fatality 
took place. Further, I find that total 911 calls also decrease in affected zip codes and 





Chapter 1: Checking Out Checkout Charity: A Study of Point-of-




In recent years, there has been a proliferation of point-of-sale donation campaigns, and it 
is natural to ask what factors increase donation rates or total donations in this setting. In this 
study, we use an experiment to compare three popular solicitation methods: a fixed donation 
request (yes or no to a randomly assigned amount); a rounding request (yes or no to an 
endogenous amount); and an open-ended solicitation. Further, we examine the effects of 
providing (limited) information on the charity. We find that, at amounts less than $1, participants 
in the rounding treatments were much more likely to donate. Holding fixed the amount of the 
ask, differences in donation rates between the rounding and fixed request treatments appear to be 
driven by “loose-change effects”, whereby individuals are more likely to donate if they would 
have less change as a result. Participants in the fixed request treatments exhibited higher mean 
willingness-to-donate than those in the open-ended. Finally, a one sentence information 
statement about the charity has positive but small effects on donation rates and amounts in the 





Point-of-sale donation (POS) campaigns have become an increasingly used fundraising 
tool. Commonly referred to as “checkout charity,” these campaigns encourage people to donate 
at the checkout register. According to report by Cause Marketing Forum (2015), checkout 
charity generated more than $388 million in donations in 2014 and more than $3.88 billion over 
the last three decades.1 There is much variation in the design of these fundraising efforts. 
Examples range from a collection box at a McDonald’s service counter, to a cashier at PetSmart 
asking a customer if they would like to donate a specific amount (e.g., $1) to help feed hungry 
pets, to an electronic ask through a payment kiosk at Walmart.  
Distinctive situational aspects such as the inability to avoid the ask, rapid decision time, 
and the amounts requested (or expected) make studying checkout charity campaigns of particular 
interest. In most charitable giving settings, a potential donor is exposed to two decision stages: 
(1) participation and (2) donation. In contrast to most settings, checkout charity campaigns rarely 
allow people the opportunity to avoid participation. Customers are usually caught unaware by the 
solicitation at checkout and are provided very few options to avoid engaging the solicitor. 
Furthermore, the actual donation stage is limited to a particularly short period of time (often 
seconds) in which the consumer must decide. This type of split-second decision-making, known 
as “impulse-giving”, is a potential contributor to the success of checkout charity campaigns.  
While there is some survey research suggesting that most consumers are agreeable to 
checkout charities and prefer some approaches over others (Catalist 2016), there is little research 
on what methods are most effective at reaching fundraising objectives (e.g., total donations or 
donation rates), and what behavioral mechanisms underlie donation behavior in the unique POS 
 
1
 This only includes campaigns that raise over $1 million. 
6 
donation setting. In this study, we raise donations for a popular charity and vary as experimental 
treatments the donation solicitation mechanism and whether or not (brief) information on the 
charity is provided.  
We use a controlled lab setting that captures the key characteristics of a checkout charity 
encounter in the field: a largely unanticipated, quick ask for a small amount of money to go 
towards a known charity. We compare three solicitation methods commonly used in POS 
campaigns: fixed donation, rounding, and open-ended. The first two, closed-ended mechanisms 
just present the potential donor with a yes or no decision. The main distinction is that in rounding 
mechanism the amount asked for is conditional on the prior actions of the donor. In the field, this 
rounding request is tied to the customer’s bill, and the common ask is to round up the bill to the 
next whole dollar amount. In the experiment, we ask the participant to round down their earnings 
from a prior experiment to the next whole dollar amount.  
In the fixed request treatment, we elicit donations for a range of amounts: 25¢, 50¢, 75¢, 
$1, $1.50, $2, and $3. This allows comparisons between the rounding treatments (at amounts of 
25¢, 50¢, and 75¢), as well as across the distribution of donations from the open-ended 
treatments. In doing so, we can make apples-to-apples comparisons by, for example, comparing 
donations or donation rates across mechanisms while holding prices fixed. Finally, similar to 
Cryder, Loewenstein, and Scheines (2013), we test whether adding a short information statement 
about the charity impacts donations.   
Our paper adds to the prior literature in many ways. To our knowledge, our study is the 
first to directly compare the popular solicitation mechanisms used in checkout charity. Most 
studies concerning charitable contributions in the literature implement a single donation 
solicitation under constructs such as mailouts, door-to-door campaigns, phone calls, etc. 
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Furthermore, these campaigns employ unstudied solicitation mechanisms such as “rounding” a 
bill to the next highest $1. We further study the effects of suggested amounts, information 
effects, framing effects, and loose-change effects in a new donation setting. The novelty of our 
study lies in our ability to compare these effects under the constraints of checkout charity in one 
comprehensive study.  
In this paper, we investigate further the drivers of charitable giving. Prior theoretical and 
experimental research suggests that charitable giving is driven by warm glow, altruism and other 
social incentives. Andreoni (1990) introduced the concept of impure altruism, speculating that 
warm glow incentivized giving. Additionally, researchers have demonstrated that social pressure, 
recognition, and the approval of others all influence an individual’s donation decision (Fathi, 
Bateson, and Nettle 2014; List 2009; Soetevent 2005). Indeed, these peer effects create social 
“norms” and can affect donation behavior in both individual and group settings. Furthermore, 
researchers speculate that individuals also give to avoid saying “no” (Andreoni and Rao 2011; 
DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier 2012). These studies suggest donation choices may be 
influences by seen, unseen, or perceived pressures.  
 Similarly, research on solicitation mechanism design has greatly contributed to the 
literature on charitable giving. Multiple studies show that suggested donation amounts can 
increase charitable donations (Edwards and List 2014; Goswami and Urminsky 2016). However, 
the effects of these suggestions have not been tested in a setting where small, potentially 
negligible amounts are solicited. Additionally, providing potential donors with information about 
the charity can increase donations (Cryder, Loewenstein, and Scheines 2013; Goswami and 
Urminsky 2016). Further, the type of information given matters. In an online eBay checkout 
charity experiment Horn and Karlan (2018) study whether the type of charity information given 
8 
during a donation request influence donation decisions, finding that certain information drivers 
(short mission statement) have a larger effect than others (popularity). However, the effects of a 
simple information statement relative to a case with no information has yet to be studied in a 
checkout charity setting.  
We should mention other studies have focused on behavior in a setting where individuals 
are asked to make a quick donation decision. Most closely related to our study is a coin 
collection experiment by Fielding and Knowles (2015). They tested verbal cues in a laboratory 
experiment and found that subjects who were verbally prompted were significantly more likely 
to donate.2 Of particular interest to our study, they also tested whether people were more willing 
to donate via coin collection if they were given smaller bills/more loose change.3 They observed 
only weak evidence to support their hypothesis of “loose-change effects”. However, other studies 
related to preferences for whole numbers lend their support. Mishra, Mishra, and 
Nayakankuppam (2006) and Reiley and Samek (2017), demonstrated that consumers exhibit a 
“bias for the whole” and preferences for round numbers. Our study contributes to a better 
understanding of these preferences in a checkout charity setting. 
Previewing our findings, we find that, at amounts less than $1, conditional donation rates 
are significantly higher in the rounding treatments relative to the fixed request and open-ended 
treatments. Differences in donation rates between the two closed-ended mechanisms appear to be 
driven by loose-change effects, whereby individuals are more likely to donate if they would have 
less change as a result. Donation rates in the fixed request treatments are either equal to or higher 
than donation rates for the open-ended treatments at various amounts. This overall leads to a 
 
2
 Here the verbal cues directed the attention of participants to the coin collection box. This created a difference of < 
8% of participants donating to > 50%. 
3
 The loose change treatment involved more $2 and $1 coins compared with the baseline treatment. 
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marginally higher mean willingness-to-donate measure. In other words, this suggests that people 
prefer a fixed donation ask. This could be due to either differences in social norms (e.g., the 
amount asked could serve as a social norm) or due to the higher cognitive burden people face 
with the open-ended ask. Additionally, a one sentence information statement about the charity 
has a positive but small effect on donation rates and amounts in the fixed request treatment. 
 
Model 
As discussed earlier, the decision time for checkout charity solicitations is relatively 
short. However, different solicitation mechanisms could have differential effects on decision cost 
during this short time period. For example, in the rounding solicitation, a potential donor is faced 
with a binary donation decision, yes or no. However, in the open-ended solicitation, a potential 
donor is faced with two decisions: whether to donate, (yes or no); and if so, how much to donate. 
Therefore, with two decisions, an open-ended solicitation may increase the cognitive burden of 
donating in the form of increased decision cost relative to a binary choice solicitation. 
To illustrate this and other differences in solicitation mechanisms, we adapt a model 
similar to that of DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012). With this model, we demonstrate the 
effects of decision cost and information across different solicitations. 
 
Closed-ended Solicitations 
We begin with the simplest case, a closed-ended or binary decision solicitation with no 
information about the charity. This case is descriptive of both a fixed amount request and a 
rounding request. In its simplest form, a donation decision involves a tradeoff between the utility 
derived from giving, such as warm-glow and altruism, and the disutility from the resulting 
10 
decrease in wealth. However, there is also a social cost embedded in the donation function, 
meaning not donating could have social consequences, generating negative utility. Due to factors 
such as peer pressure and social norms, giving less than the socially optimal amount (including 
$0 donations) places an additional burden on the donation decision of a potential donor.  
This relationship between the costs and benefits of donating is characterized by the 
following utility function: 
 
(1) 𝑈(𝑔) = 𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑔) + 𝑎𝑣(𝑔, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑠(𝑔)   
 
A consumer with initial wealth 𝑊 will choose to donate an amount 𝑔 ≥ 0 to a checkout charity 
campaign. We assume that the “private” utility function 𝑢(∙) is concave, and that utility increases 
with wealth and decreases in the amount donated. 
The function 𝑣(∙) is the utility derived from charitable donations, which depends on the 
amount the individual donates (𝑔), as well as the giving of others (𝐺−𝑖). We further assume that 
utility is a function of the donor’s knowledge of the charity (ℎ), such as the information they 
have on what activities the charity engages in. We assume the function is monotonically 
increasing, and concave in 𝑔, with 𝑣(0, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) = 0. Thus, an agent only derives utility from 
giving if they give some amount 𝑔 > 0. Here, the parameter 𝑎 represents the level of altruism. In 
the case of pure altruism, the individual cares about the total contributions to the charity, 𝐺−𝑖 +
𝑔, meaning the overall utility from giving equals 𝑎𝑣(𝑔 + 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ).
4 However, altruism can be 
impure, meaning an individual cares about the warm glow from giving 𝑔. In this case, the 
 
4 As in DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012), here 𝑎 also has the ability to capture the belief a donor has about 
the quality of the charity. 
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parameter 𝑎 captures the intensity of warm glow. Note that it is possible for an individual to have 
both pure and impure altruistic motivations for giving; meaning 𝑎 captures the relative utility 
gained from total contributions and individual warm glow.5 
The function 𝑠(𝑔) represents the social cost function generated from social pressure and 
social norms where 𝑠(𝑔) = 𝑆 ∗ (𝑔𝑠 − 𝑔) ∙ 1𝑔<𝑔𝑠 ≥ 0. The severity of the social cost to an 
individual is represented by the parameter 𝑆. Thus 𝑆 is a parameter representing the relative 
social pressure a potential donor feels. Here, social cost is born for a donation 𝑔 less than the 
socially optimal amount or social norm 𝑔𝑠 or (𝑔 < 𝑔𝑠). In the closed-ended treatments, we 
assume that the socially optimal amount to give is the solicited amount. Therefore, by giving in a 
closed-ended solicitation, an individual’s donation will always be equal to the socially optimal 
amount, or 𝑔 = 𝑔𝑠. Thus, only donations of 𝑔 = $0 elicit some social cost. 
When we introduce information about the charity in the solicitation, we assume that the 
information would have a positive effect on the utility of donating, i.e. the more a donor knows 
about where their money is going or how it might be used, the greater the utility of donating. 
This then alters ℎ, and we hypothesize that this increases 𝑣(), at least for those who know very 
little about the charity.6 This assumption is in line with previous experimental findings related to 
information in charitable donations. Therefore, an individual is more likely to donate when 
information about the charity is present. 
 
5 Assumptions related to the altruism parameter, 𝑎, are directly taken from the model in DellaVigna, List, and 
Malmendier (2012). Also, in their paper 𝑎, can also be less than zero, if individuals give out of spite. In this case, the 
𝑎𝑣(∙) would represent the disutility of giving. 
6 As in DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012), here 𝑎 also has the ability to capture the belief a donor has about 
the quality of the charity. 
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 Given the up or down choice presented with a closed-ended solicitation, the individual 
optimally donates the amount requested, 𝑔𝑠, if the utility from doing so is equal to or greater 
than the utility of not donating: 
 
(2) 𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑔𝑠) + 𝑎𝑣(𝑔𝑠, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑠(𝑔
𝑠) ≥ 𝑢(𝑊) + 𝑎𝑣(0, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑠(0)  
 
Open-ended Solicitations 
For an open-ended solicitation, individuals have the freedom to choose any donation 
amount. While this might be beneficial if an individual’s underlying willingness to donate is 
greater than a fixed amount solicitation, the solicitation itself might induce more costs to 
donation. For example, in this scenario, an individual must expend cognitive effort to determine 
what amount they would like to give. This effort may increase or decrease depending on their 
familiarity with their own willingness to donate and the socially optimal amount to give. We 
incorporate this cognitive cost as a function, 𝑑(∙), as shown in equation 3.  
 
 (3) 𝑈(𝑔) = 𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑔) + 𝑎𝑣(𝑔, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑠(𝑔) − 𝑑(𝜎) 
 
In this case, the donation, 𝑔, is decided by the individual. For the social pressure function, 
𝑠(𝑔), this means that contributing does not necessarily result in zero social pressure costs. Now, 
giving some amount less than the socially optimal donation, 𝑔𝑠, might be seen as socially 
undesirable, resulting in some social cost to the individual. Thus, even a positive contribution 
where 𝑔∗ < 𝑔𝑠 will result in some social pressure cost in this utility function. The farther away 𝑔 
is from the socially optimal amount, 𝑔𝑠, the larger the social cost to the individual. 
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Additionally, the socially optimal amount to give might not be known to the individual. It 
is possible that an individual misestimates 𝑔𝑠 due to uncertainty and donates less than the actual 
socially optimal amount. Thus, there is some positive probability that an individual might pay 
some social cost even if they donate 𝑔∗ = 𝐸[𝑔−𝑖] or 𝑔
∗ = 𝐸[𝑔𝑠]. However, an individual can 
reduce the likelihood of misestimating the socially optimal amount by paying some effort cost, 
𝑑. 
In equation 3, the effort cost function, 𝑑(𝜎), represents the cognitive burden of deciding 
on donation, 𝑔∗ whereby an individual may expend effort, increasing 𝑑, to better estimate the 
socially optimal donation 𝑔𝑠, lowering the probability of paying 𝑠(𝑔).7 This function increases 
with the variance, 𝜎, of the socially optimal amount 𝑔𝑠. Meaning, if the variance of the socially 
optimal amount to give is sufficiently high, more cognitive effort is required to estimate a 
socially optimal amount to give. 
 
Utility Maximization 
 To maximize utility in donation decision-making, an individual will first decide if he or 
she will donate at all. With an open-ended solicitation, an individual knows that by choosing to 
donate, they will bear additional decision cost, 𝑑. Therefore, the individual chooses whether or 
not to donate by calculating their net utility in both cases. 
 
If he or she does not donate: 
𝑔 = 0  and  𝑔 ≠ 𝑔𝑠 
 
7 Thus, 𝑔𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑔−𝑖) with variance 𝜎, or the expected value of others’ donations (i.e. the social norm). 
 
14 
Thus, 𝑠(0) > 0 
𝑈(0) = 𝑢(𝑊) + 𝑎𝑣(0, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑠(0) 
If he or she does donates: 
𝑔 > 0   
Thus, 𝑠(𝑔∗) =  𝑆 ∗ (𝑔𝑠 − 𝑔∗) ∙ 1𝑔∗<𝑔𝑠 ≥ 0 
𝑈(𝑔∗ > 0) = 𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑔∗) + 𝑎𝑣(𝑔∗, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑠(𝑔
∗) − 𝑑(𝜎) 
 
Comparing these two utility functions, if 𝑈(𝑔 > 0) > 𝑈(0), then the net utility of donating is 
greater than that of not donating and the individual will donate. If 𝑈(𝑔 > 0) < 𝑈(0), then the 
net utility of donating is less than that of abstaining. Thus, the individual will not donate. Note 
that in the case where a person gives, the difference between closed-ended and open-ended 
utility functions is the potential social cost and effort cost, 𝑠(𝑔) & 𝑑(𝜎). 
 
Comparison of Closed versus Open-ended Solicitations 
 Comparing the two solicitation mechanism’s utility maximization, the utility of donating 
𝑔∗ is greater in the closed-ended solicitation (left) than the open-ended solicitation (right) due to 
the inclusion of potential social cost and decision cost. At any amount 𝑔∗, an individual will be 
more likely to donate under a closed-ended mechanism versus an open-ended mechanism. This 
assumption holds as long as 𝑑(𝜎) > 0, or decision cost is non-negative. We use this model to 
derive testable hypothesis based on our experimental design.  
 
 (4)  𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑔∗) + 𝑎𝑣(𝑔∗, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) >  𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑔
∗) + 𝑎𝑣(𝑔∗, 𝐺−𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑠(𝑔




Within the constraints of the experimental laboratory, we designed an experiment to test a 
variety of methods that parallel those commonly used in real checkout charity campaigns. We 
examine three solicitation mechanisms, which we label as Fixed Request, Rounding, and Open-
ended, under two information conditions.  
We decided on the first two solicitation methods (Fixed Request and Rounding) due to 
their perceived popularity. In a consumer survey report released by Catalist (2016), the “add $1” 
(a fixed donation request) was the most preferred method of donation at the register at 46 
percent. Following close behind was the rounding method with 23% of consumers preferring it. 
While those surveyed did not express a preference for an open-ended ask, this approach is 
nevertheless commonly used, especially when the solicitation is through a POS kiosk where it is 
simple for consumers to freely enter a donation amount.8 We decided to add an Open-ended 
donation mechanism for two reasons: (1) to test whether a closed-ended ask elicits higher 
donation rates than an open-ended ask as our theory suggests, and (2) to account for the 
possibility that our requested amounts might be too low or too high for this setting.9 For the 
Fixed Request, we decided to test a variety of donation amounts, 25¢, 50¢, 75¢, $1, $1.50, $2.00, 
and $3.00. With these donation amounts we are able to establish reference points for a 
comparison to the Rounding mechanism at 25¢, 50¢, and 75¢. This allows us to better study 
potential framing effects and/or loose-change effects between Fixed Request and Rounding 
treatments.  
 
8 A related approach is one where customers have the option to select one of several possible donation amounts or 
instead enter an amount of their choosing.  
9 The Open-ended treatments were added after we ran the first session. 
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In an effort to expand our investigation of checkout charity methods, we further test an 
information component. Under our baseline or no information setting, individuals only receive 
the name of the charity. This reflects common practice for POS donation campaigns, and likely 
reflects a compromise for businesses who want to raise money while minimizing impacts on 
customers (e.g., reducing transaction speed). Nevertheless, adding information about a charity 
has been shown to increase donations. Secondly, among consumers reporting no donations at the 
register, “not knowing much about the cause asking for money” was the number one cause for 
declining to donate (Catalist 2016).10  
Based on the literature, we derived a single descriptive sentence indicating specific uses 
for monetary donations to provide the additional charity information customers might desire. 
Specifically related to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, we gathered information about 
donation usage from their website and formed the following informational sentence: “Through 
donations, St. Jude's patients (children) receive care, treatment, and cutting edge research, at no 
cost to their families”. Therefore, whether a subject received a donation prompt with or without 
information determined the final set of treatments. Table 1.1 shows the finalized mechanisms 
and treatments.11 
While reflecting on our subject pool (college students), we decided to choose St. Jude 
Children’s Research Hospital as the recipient charity for two reasons. First, St. Jude’s is well 
known and one of the highest grossing charities. We feared that choosing a lesser-known charity 
would create problems of nonrecognition and induce exceptionally low donation rates. Second, 
we also chose St. Jude’s because the research hospital has been involved in many checkout 
 
10 28% of respondents listed charity brand recognition as the number one reason for giving (2015 Americas Charity 
Checkout Champions). 
11 All tables and figures for Chapter 1 are located in Appendix A. 
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charity campaigns over the years. Using a charity that already engages in checkout charity is 
particularly useful in this setting.12 
Subsequently, the names of all six treatments are as follows: Fixed Request (FR), Fixed 
Request Info (FRI), Rounding (R), Rounding Info (RI), Open-ended (OE), and Open-ended Info 
(OEI). With this design, we can make direct comparisons between solicitation mechanisms to 
determine which solicitation is the most effective.  
 
Hypotheses 
To compare effects, we merge our model with existing theory and common findings in the 
literature and form six testable null hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Fixed-Request mean donations will equal Open-ended mean 
donations. 
Hypothesis 2: Closed-ended mechanism donation rates the same as Open-ended 
mechanism donation rates.  
Hypothesis 3: Potential donors provided with charity information will donate at 
the same rate and amount than those not provided with information. 
Hypothesis 4: Donation rates are constant as the donation amount solicited 
increases. 
Hypothesis 5: Potential donors who can reduce coinage by donating will give at 
the same rate as those who would have more (or equal) change. 
Hypothesis 6: The willingness-to-donate distributions of the Fixed Request and 
Open-ended treatments are equal.  
 
12 Participants might see the solicitation as more legitimate if they have experienced something similar previously. 
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Here, we use the theoretical model to speculate possible behavioral drivers that would 
lead to rejections of the above hypotheses. For Hypothesis 1 (H1), a rejection might occur if 
donors’ underlying willingness-to-donate is much higher than the amounts solicited in the Fixed 
Request treatment. Additionally, a rejection might occur if potential donors over or 
underestimate the socially normative donation amount relative to the donation amounts in the 
Fixed Request treatments. For Hypothesis 2, based on the theoretical model discussed 
previously, it is possible that the lack of a value cue in the Open-ended treatments imposes some 
cognitive cost, reducing the incentive to donate. This is especially true if the variance of the 
social norm is quite large, causing donors to expend more effort or misestimate the social norm. 
For example, it is possible that the social norm in the Open-ended treatments is perceived to be 
0. This would, in turn, alleviate any social pressure and give rise to lower donation rates. If 
potential donors are unsure of either the socially acceptable donation amount or whether they 
should donate at all, they might opt out of donating, rather than exert cognitive effort.  
Testing Hypothesis 3 allows us to determine if information affects donation rates and 
mean donations. Based on outcomes related to the theory model and previous information studies 
mentioned earlier, we expect that introducing information about a charity increases both 
donation rates and amounts. Both the brevity of the information provided and the particular 
charity we use may alter the magnitude of this effect relative to those found in previous studies. 
Turning to Hypothesis 4, we expect that donation rates will decline as the specific 
donation requested increases, given that the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing and the 
marginal utility of giving is increasing with the donation amount. For Hypothesis 5, we can look 
for possible “loose change effects,” testing whether individuals who can reduce coinage by 
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donating give at higher rates than those who would increase coinage by donating. This 
hypothesis is best tested with the Fixed Request treatment. We cannot use this test for the 
Rounding mechanism because every participant randomized into this mechanism will 
automatically reduce coinage by donating. For the Open-ended mechanism, we can compare the 
percentages of donors who self-rounded down their earnings (gave themselves less change by 
donating) to those who did not.  
Finally, for Hypothesis 6, we want to examine whether the underlying willingness-to-
donate distributions are similar between the Fixed Request and Open-ended treatments. By 
extending the amounts solicited in the Fixed Request treatments beyond $1, we are able to make 
distributional comparisons between the two treatments. 
 
Experimental Methods 
 The data was collected via laboratory sessions at the UT Experimental Economics 
Laboratory in two stages: 1) Summer and Fall of 2017 and 2) Fall of 2019.13 All participants 
were currently enrolled undergraduate students at the University of Tennessee. All decisions 
were made on personal computers using software programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
This experiment was a tag-a-long, joint experiment with four unrelated economics experiments. 
In the related experiments, subjects earned both a show-up fee as well as earnings based on 
incentivized decisions. Subjects’ earnings were directly tied to their performance in the 
experiment and are therefore considered earned income. After viewing their earnings at the end 
 
13 Data collection took place in two stages. Analysis of the initial data revealed exceptionally high donation rates for 
the Fixed Request and Rounding treatments as well as possible differences in distributions between closed and open-
ended treatments. As we were going to collect additional data anyways, this prompted us to add additional amounts 
in the Fixed Request treatment beyond $1, providing us with better comparisons between the Rounding and Fixed 
Request treatments at $0.25 and $0.75. 
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of the first experiment, subjects were then prompted to donate a portion of their earnings to St. 
Jude Children’s Research Hospital.14 Figure 1.1 shows what subjects would have seen in the 
Fixed Request mechanism without information. 
As shown, subjects were able to select the option of “Yes” or “No thanks.” The Fixed 
Request donation screen with information would appear with the same wording but include the 
informational sentence after the donation prompt. As for the Rounding mechanism, in a real 
checkout charity situation, customers would normally be prompted with a statement such as, 
“would you like to round up your purchase of $19.75 to $20.00 and donate $0.25 to St. Jude 
Children’s Research Hospital today?” However, because our subjects did not make purchases, 
but rather earned money, we asked them if they would like to round down their earnings 
instead.15 On the donation screen, subjects were given information about their earnings from that 
session and the following prompt: “Would you like to round down your earnings to the nearest 
whole dollar by donating $0.XX to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital?” 
 As stated earlier, subjects’ earnings were a direct reflection of performance in the 
preceding experiment. Earnings were rounded to the nearest quarter to limit donation asks to 
increments of 25¢. Thus, collected data involves asks of $0.25, $0.50, and $0.75, which 
facilitates well-powered comparisons with the other mechanisms.16 
In an effort to gather feedback on participant donation decisions, we asked a follow-up 
question, contingent on their response to the donation prompt, on the next screen. Those who 
donated were asked to disclose their reasons for giving via the following question: “Why did you 
 
14 Treatment was randomized at the individual level. 
15 While rounding down may not be equivalent to rounding up in a purchase setting, our findings still suggest that 
there are important differences in donation rates using this mechanism that might be explored further in a purchase 
setting. We discuss this further in the conclusion of this paper. 
16 In one of the experiments, earnings prior to the ask were in 5-cent increments. This yielded 10 observations where 
people were asked amounts other than 25, 50, or 75. These observations are excluded from the data analysis. 
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chose to donate a portion of your earnings to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital? (Please 
check all that apply)”. Subjects were allowed to check one or many of the suggested reasons. 
Additionally, we provided an open-ended comment box where they could input their own 
answer. Figure 1.2 displays the options presented to subjects on the screen. 
Likewise, subjects who decided not to donate were given the prompt: “Why did you 
choose not to donate a portion of your earnings to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital? 
(Please check all that apply)”. Options presented to these subjects are displayed in Figure 1.3. 
Finally, subjects completed a brief questionnaire in which demographic characteristics 
were collected. In the questionnaire, one last follow-up question was presented. We asked 
subjects “Did you enjoy being asked to donate a portion of your earnings to charity?” with 
response options “Yes”, “No”, and “Indifferent”.  
At the conclusion of the experiment, subjects were shown a letter that would be 
accompanying their donation to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. In the letter, we provided 
information about where the money was coming from, how it was collected, as well as a 
statement confirming that we would not be using these donations for our own tax purposes. A 
copy of this letter can be found in the appendix.  
At no time were subjects made aware about the donation portion of the experiment in any 
of the instructions. This allows us to better study reactions to an unexpected, quick-decision 
situation similar to checkout charity. Finally, subjects were encouraged to email the 






A total of 906 students participated in the study. Table 1.2 shows descriptive statistics. 
57% of the subjects were male and 42% female. The average donation rate across all treatments 
was approximately 49%.17 In total this experiment collected $377.50 in donations for St. Jude 
Children’s Research Hospital. Subject’s earnings ranged from $6.75 to $36.75.18 Overall, 
average earnings across all sessions were $22.79 and the mean age 20. Donations across all 
subjects averaged $0.42, while donations among contributors averaged $0.85.  
Figure 1.4 illustrates donation rates by mechanism. For the two closed-ended 
mechanisms (Fixed Request and Rounding), the numbers simply reflect the percentage of “yes” 
responses at each dollar amount. These rates represent the lower bound of willingness-to-donate 
at the specific donation amount. For the Open-ended treatment, presented is a discrete version of 
a survival function, which reflects the percentage of respondents that donated at least a particular 
amount, calculated at amounts used in the Fixed Request treatments. This allows us to make an 
apples-to-apples comparison with closed-ended mechanisms. 
As expected, donation rates generally decline as the donation asked increases. Visually, 
the Rounding treatment had the highest donation rates at donation requests less than $1.19 In 
comparison, donation rates for the Fixed Request treatment are somewhat lower than the 
Rounding for asks at $0.25 and $0.50, but much lower at an ask of $0.75. Donation rates for the 
Fixed Request treatment continue to decline at amounts greater than $1. For amounts less than 
$1, donation rates in the Open-ended treatment are lower than that of both closed-ended 
 
17 This calculation is using the raw data not taking into account the average amount solicited between mechanisms. 
18 The range of earnings was determined by the four unrelated experiments which varied in length (30-90 min). 
Earnings are correlated with performance and session duration. 
19 Tests confirming the significance of this relationship across treatments can be found in the Appendix. 
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treatments (except at $0.75). However, donation rates between the Fixed Request and Open-
ended mechanisms are nearly equal for donations amounts greater than $1. 
 Table 1.3 provides a breakdown of outcomes by treatment that are unconditional on the 
amount requested (if any). The Rounding treatment without information had the highest donation 
rate at 82.02%. Performing simple parametric t-tests and pooling observations by solicitation 
mechanism, we find that the difference in donation rates between the Fixed Request and 
Rounding treatments (-39.57%, p < 0.000) is statistically significant. Even if we limit 
observations in the Fixed Request treatment to solicitations less than $1, the difference in 
donation rates is still statistically significant (-22.66%, p < 0.000). Additionally, t-tests between 
the Open-ended and Rounding treatments reveal a significant difference in donation rates 
(38.37%, p < 0.000). 
 The Open-ended treatments produced the highest mean donations across all participants 
and all contributors. However, this was conditional on being allowed to donate any amount. In 
the two closed-ended treatments, participants were only allowed to give the requested amount. 
Again, we pool observations by mechanism and use parametric t-tests of means to determine if 
differences in donation amounts between mechanisms are significantly different. We find 
differences in donation amounts are statistically significant for comparisons between the Fixed 
Request and Open-ended treatments (-$0.42, p < 0.000) and the Rounding and Open-ended 
treatments (-$0.42, p < 0.000).  
The summary statistics suggest that information has a positive effect on donation rates in 
the Fixed Request and Open-ended treatments. However, the effect is in the opposite direction 
for the Rounding treatment. Parametric t-tests of means reveal only significant difference in 
donation rates due to information occurs in the Fixed Request mechanism (-8.23%, p < 0.04). 
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Additionally, information seems to have had a positive effect on donation amounts in the Fixed 




To gain additional insights, as well as to control for other factors that may also be driving 
differences across treatments, we estimate ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent 
variable, Gave, is an indicator of whether a participant donated. In model 1, the included 
explanatory variables are a set of treatment-specific indicator variables. In model 2, we add to 
the specification experimental earnings, age, gender and whether they had recently donated to 
charity. the Open-ended treatment without information (T3) as our baseline. These regressions 
are presented in Table 1.4. 
 Participants in the Rounding treatment without information donated at a rate 44.1 
percentage points higher than those in the Open-ended treatment. Coefficients on both the 
Rounding indicator variables are statistically different from the coefficients for the Fixed 
Request indicators. Additionally,  
In model 2, we include additional control variables to establish whether the results in 
model 1 are robust including experimental earnings, age, gender and whether participants had 
recently donated to charity. Coefficients for all indicator variables remain similar and significant. 
However, Earnings and Recent are also significant. For every dollar increase in experimental 
earnings, a participant’s donation rate increased 1.7 percentage points. However, participants 
who indicated they had recently donated to charity were 10.4 percentage points less likely to 
donate.  
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However, these regressions are not accurate comparisons of treatments due to differences 
in amounts asked. The Rounding treatment is limited to asks of $0.25, $0.50, or $0.75 while the 
Fixed Request ask range between $0.25-$3. Finally, there are no bounds in the Open-ended 
treatment. Thus, a simple regression of treatment indicators is not an accurate comparison 
between treatments. 
 In Table 1.5, we provide a comparison between all three treatments at amounts less than 
$1 (i.e. $0.25, $0.50, $0.75). So as to make data from the Open-ended treatments comparable, we 
randomly assigned an ask of $0.25, $0.50, or $0.75 to each participant and then recorded yes/no 
responses based on whether the actual amount given is at least as high as the randomly assigned 
amount.  
Model 1 shows a simple regression using only treatment indicators on Gave, an indicator 
of whether or not a participant donated. The baseline treatment is the Open-ended without 
information. From this model, the Rounding mechanism yields the highest donation rates and the 
open-ended mechanism the lowest.  Differences between either closed-ended mechanism and the 
open-ended mechanism are rather stark, with a 42.2 percentage point difference for the Rounding 
mechanism and 19.6 percentage point difference for the Fixed Request. Both of these differences 
are statistically significant (p < 0.01). Similarly, based on coefficients between the two 
treatments, participants facing the Rounding mechanism donate 22.6 percentage points more 
often than those in the Fixed Request setting, and this difference is also statistically significant (p 
< 0.01). The coefficient on Information is not significant, indicating information had no effect 
across all treatments. 
Model 2 expands upon Model 1 to control for the amount asked; in particular, we include 
indicators for $0.50 and $0.75, making the baseline ask $0.25. Treatment coefficients are similar 
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in magnitude and significance. In addition, the indicator for an ask of $0.75 is negative and 
significant. In particular, participants asked to donate $0.75 donated 14.4 percentage points less 
often than those asked to donate $0.25. 
Model 3 incorporates demographic control variables. Coefficients on treatment and price 
indicators are similar to models 1 and 2. For the demographic controls, coefficients on 
experimental earnings and whether a participant had recently donated to charity are both 
significant. An $1 increase in experimental earnings leads to a 1.6 percentage point increase in 
the likelihood of donating across all treatments. However, if a participant indicated that they had 
recently donated to charity, they were 7.2 percentage points less likely to donate.20 
 From the results in Table 1.4 we can conclude there are significant differences in 
donation rates between all three treatments at amounts less than $1. Participants randomized into 
the Rounding treatment were much more likely to donate than those in the Fixed Request 
treatment. Similarly, participants randomized into the Open-ended treatment were much less 
likely to donate than those randomized into the Fixed Request treatment. Thus, we can reject the 
null of hypothesis 2, conditional on ask being less than $1; participants are more likely to donate 
under a closed-ended solicitation versus an open-ended solicitation. 
Because the amounts solicited are held fixed in the above analysis, the difference in 
donation rates between the two closed-ended treatments could be due to two possible factors: 
framing effects and/or loose-change effects.21 If the difference were driven by framing effects, 
participants would be more inclined to donate based on the way the question is asked (rounding 
versus fixed request). However, if participants are more inclined to donate because they have a 
 
20 Participants were asked about recent donation after the solicitation. Therefore, this relationship is not necessarily 
causal.  
21 As noted in Table4, comparisons of donation rates between the Fixed Request and Rounding treatments only 
include observations where the requested amount is either $0.25, $0.50, or $0.75. 
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preference for whole numbers (or less/no change), this could explain the difference in donation 
rates between the Rounding and Fixed Request mechanisms.  
 
Loose-change Effects 
To determine whether donations were motivated by “loose-change effects,” we create a 
dummy variable to indicate whether donating the suggested amount would increase or decrease a 
subject’s amount of change. For example, if a subject earns $16.75 for the session and is 
prompted to donate $0.50, donating will decrease the subject’s amount of change relative to not 
donating. Therefore, significant differences in donation rates relative to whether subjects 
increase or decrease their change through donation is indicative of loose-change effects. 
To determine if “loose-change effects” significantly affect donation rates, we examine 
each mechanism individually. For the Fixed Request mechanism, we divide individuals into two 
groups, those who would receive less change by donating and those would receive more change 
by donating. Then, we perform a chi squared distribution test for donation rates. As displayed in 
Table 1.6, the average donation rate is only 38.78% for those who would receive more change by 
donating whereas the average donation for those who would receive less change by donating is 
81.51%. Notice that donation rate for those in the Fixed Request treatment who would receive 
less change by donating is very similar to the donation rate of 79.47% in the Rounding 
mechanism. 
Additionally, we look at loose-change effects in the Open-ended treatments by dividing 
subjects into three groups: those who gave themselves less change by donating, those who gave 
themselves equal change by donating, and those who gave themselves more change by donating. 
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78 percent of subjects that donated gave themselves less change, 22 percent gave themselves 
equal amounts of change, and 0 percent gave themselves more change. 
In addition to these tests across mechanisms, we also find anecdotal evidence of loose-
change effects from the comment section in the post experimental survey. Participants left 
comments such as “I didn’t want a quarter” and “I don’t like change anyways,” indicating that 
loose change effects had an impact on their donation decision. With this evidence, we conclude 
that loose-change effects, rather than framing effects, are driving the significant difference in 
donation rates across the two closed-ended mechanisms. 
 
Donation Amounts 
We now begin our analysis of treatment effects on donation amounts. Using an similar 
specification to that used in Table 1.4, we regress treatment indicators on donation amounts. We 
use ordinary least squares estimation with Donation Amount as our dependent variable and the 
Open-ended treatment without information (T3) as our baseline. 
Model 1 in Table 1.7 shows this regression. All coefficients on indicators for the 
Rounding and Fixed Request treatments are statistically significant. Participants in the Fixed 
Request treatment donated $0.45 to $0.54 less on average than those in the Open-ended 
treatment without information. Similarly, participants in the rounding treatments donated $0.42-
$0.44 less than those in the Open-ended treatment without information. The differences between 
the two coefficients on the Fixed Request treatment indicators and the Rounding treatment 
indicators are statistically significant (all p < 0.003). There are no significant differences between 
the Fixed Request treatments with and without information as well as the Rounding treatments 
with and without information. 
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Model 2 shows the same indicator variables but also includes controls for experimental 
earnings, age, gender, and whether participants had recently donated to charity. Results are 
similar to Model 1 with respect to indicator variable coefficient values and significance. In 
addition, experimental earnings have a positive significant effect on donation amount, meaning 
an increase in experimental earnings by $1 translates to increase of $0.02 in donation amount. 
Further, if a participant indicated that they had recently donated to charity, their average donation 
was $0.08 lower than those who indicated they had not recently donated. 
However, this is not an accurate comparison between treatments as donation amounts 
were limited to less than $1 in the Rounding treatment and between $0.25 and $3 for the Fixed 
Request treatment. To get a better idea of differences in donation amounts across bounded and 
unbounded solicitations, we estimate participants’ willingness-to-donate.  
 
 Willingness to Donate 
The experimental design includes a large range of ask amounts for the Fixed request 
treatments. As suggested by the prior analysis, while we can compare the donation rates for the 
Fixed request and Open-ended mechanisms at each amount this is an inefficient way to proceed. 
We can instead estimate willingness-to-donate (WTD) distributions, which effectively means 
that we fit curves to the data presented in Table 1.3. By doing so, we can estimate measures of 
central tendency, e.g., mean WTD. This mean WTD can be interpreted as the dollar amount an 
average person would have donated under the Fixed Request mechanism, absent the constraints 
imposed by asking for a particular dollar amount.  
To estimate WTD distributions, we use standard approaches from the broader literature 
that uses binary choice data to undertake welfare analysis (e.g., Cameron and James, 1987). In 
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particular, we employ the interval regression estimator, which accommodates our mix of 
continuous (Open-ended) and binary censored (Fixed request) data. In the Fixed Request 
treatment, we obtain either an upper or lower bound on an individual’s WTD. For participants 
who donated, the lower bound is represented by their donation amount with an unknown upper 
bound (right-censored). For participants who chose not to donate, the amount solicited is the 
upper bound while the lower bound is $0 (left-censored).22 In our estimation, we assume that 
WTD is non-negative, which is logical given our setting. In the Open-ended treatment, we know 
the exact upper and lower bounds as they are equal to one another and represented by the chosen 
donation amount (continuous).23 Using these upper and lower bounds, we jointly estimate WTD 
distributions for both treatments shown in Table 1.8. In doing so, we allow for differences in 
both the means and the variances across mechanisms. 
Mean WTD for participants randomized into the Fixed Request treatment is $1.02 
(Model 1) and mean WTD in the Open-ended treatment is $0.82 (Model 1). As mean donations 
from the Open-ended mechanism are $0.83 and $0.81 without and with information, 
respectively, based on the “raw” data (see Table 1.2), this provides some evidence of a 
reasonable model “fit”. Model 2 incorporates additional control variables for whether treatments 
contained information about the charity and participants earnings, age, gender, and whether they 
had recently donated to charity. Model 2 shows a significant difference in mean willingness-to-
donate between the Fixed Request and Open-ended treatments. Mean WTD for the Fixed 
Request treatment is similar to Model 1 at $1.04 while mean WTD in the Open-ended treatment 
 
22 We assume that willingness-to-donate is non-negative. Thus, the lower bound for donations is 0. 
23 We do not include the Rounding treatment in this estimation for two reasons: 1) the donation asks are small and 




is $0.79, a difference significant at the 10% level. Further, including information about the 
charity has a positive significant effect on WTD, increasing WTD by $0.12 at the mean. 
Participants’ experimental earnings had a positive significant effect on WTD, while reported 
recent donations to charity had a negative significant effect on WTD. 
In both models we allowed the variance of the two treatments to be different. As shown 
in Table 1.8, the variance terms of both treatments are significantly different from one another, 
with the Open-ended treatment having a much higher variance in donations than the Fixed 
Request treatment. This could be because of decision errors tied to the complexity of the task. 
Without a reference point or suggested donations, the variance in donations is much higher in the 
Open-ended treatment. Therefore, we can reject the null for hypothesis 5, as we find significant 
differences in both the mean and variance of willingness-to-donate between the Fixed Request 




 While the results in Table 1.8 show that information had a significant effect on donation 
amounts across all treatments, we might be interested in whether information has a positive 
significant effect in every treatment. We use t-tests to generate pairwise comparisons of average 
donations between treatments with and without information as shown in Table 1.9. It appears 
that the effect observed in Table 1.8 is primarily driven by the Fixed Request treatment. t-tests 
are positive and significant for Fixed Request comparison. The addition of information under a 
Fixed Request solicitation led to a significant increase in donations of $0.09. 
 We further examine whether information had an effect on donation rates. Thus, also 
shown in Table 1.9 are pairwise comparisons of donation rates between treatments with and 
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without information. T-tests are positive and significant for both the pooled and Fixed Request 
comparisons. Similar to donation rates, participants randomized into the Fixed Request treatment 
with information gave 8.23 percentage points more often on average than those randomized into 
the treatment without information. There are no significant effects of information in the pooled 
case or other treatments related to donation rate. 
 As a robustness check, we regress information and treatment dummies on our two 
outcomes of interest, Donation Amount and whether a person donated (Gave). Tables 1.10 and 
1.11 display these regressions respectively. Model 1 begins with a simple regression of an 
information dummy on Donation Amount. The coefficient on information is not statistically 
significant. Model 2 incorporates treatment indicators and interactions with the information 
dummy variable. Neither of the interactions with information are statistically significant. 
However, both indicator variables for Fixed and Rounding treatments are statistically significant. 
Finally, model 3 includes demographic controls. Like Table 1.7, experimental earnings have a 
positive effect on donation amount while recently donating to charity had a negative effect on 
donation amount. 
 Table 1.11 is similar to Table 1.10, but here the dependent variable is whether or not a 
person gave to charity. In model 1, the information dummy is positive and significant, indicating 
that information had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of donating by 6.9 
percentage points across all treatments. In model 2, incorporating treatment indicators and 
interactions with information causes the coefficient on the information dummy to become 
insignificant. Finally, in model 3, the coefficient on the information dummy is again, no longer 
significant. 
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 Thus, the robustness checks for information in Table 1.10 and 1.11 reveal little to no 
effect on donation rates or amounts. This could be due to a couple of reasons. First, small 
information effects might be crowded out by other treatment effects. Additionally, we chose a 
well-known charity, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. While we chose this charity to ensure 
high donation rates, we might have confounded the purpose of the informational component by 
choosing a charity that is vastly popular and well known. In addition, children’s charities, like St. 
Jude’s, are the highest grossing charities due to the emotion impact of their cause.24 As such, we 
propose that the use of a lesser-known charity, with less emotional appeal would be a better 
choice to study information effects further.  
 
Motives 
 After donation, we asked subjects a follow up question where subjects had the option to 
select one or more reasons behind their donation decision. Of the subjects that donated, the most 
popular selection was “I like the Charity,” with 59% (displayed in Figure 1.5) with “The amount 
suggested was a reasonable request” in close second with 55%. The most popular reason selected 
for subjects who chose not to donate was “I recently donated to charity” at 34% with “I just 
didn’t want to” as the second most popular answer at 29% (displayed in Figure 1.6).25 This could 
indicate that these subjects have recently given to charity by other means or it could indicate that 
subjects feel obligated to say so due to social norms. On average, subjects gave an average of 
1.84 reasons for their donation decision. However, subjects that donated gave an average of 2.53 
reasons, while subjects that declined to donate gave an average of 1.17 reasons. 
 
24 Catalyst (2016) 
25
 Each subject could select more than one option, so the percentages will not add up to 100. 
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 When asked whether they enjoyed being asked to donate, the most popular answer was 
“Yes” at 43.4% and “Indifferent” in second place at 43.1%. Interestingly, only 13.5% answered 
“No.” Table 1.12 provided a breakdown of participants’ donation decision and enjoyment of 
being asked to donate. An overwhelming majority of participants who donated selected that they 
either enjoyed or were indifferent to being asked to donate. Only 2.6% of subjects donated but 
did not like being asked to do so. This indicates that there might be a small but present social 
pressure to donate, even if subjects do not want to. Meaning, for these participants, the social 
pressure cost outweighed the utility from donating. For those who chose not to donate, most 
selected that they were indifferent. Interestingly, 12.6% of participants chose not to donate, but 
enjoyed being asked to do so. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we are able to compare three popular checkout charity solicitation 
mechanisms. We find that, at amounts less than $1, participants in the Rounding treatment were 
much more likely to donate than those in the Fixed Request and Open-ended treatments. 
Differences in donation rates between the Rounding and Fixed Request treatments are primarily 
driven by loose-change effects, whereby individuals are more likely to donate if they would have 
less change as a result. Participants in the Fixed Request treatment exhibited higher mean 
willingness-to-donate than those in the Open-ended. However, the variance in willingness-to-
donate in the Open-ended treatment was much higher. Additionally, a one sentence information 
statement about the charity has a positive significant effect on donation rates and amounts in the 
Fixed Request treatment.  
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 When choosing a checkout charity method, the “successfulness” of a particular fundraiser 
might be different for different organizations. One organization might care about methods that 
garner the highest donations whereas others might care more about participation rates. Thus, 
choosing between higher average donations (Fixed Request) versus higher donation rates 
(Rounding) might depend on a charities goals. Additionally, an individual’s mean willingness-to-
donate might not be identical across different charities. Therefore, calibrating mean willingness-
to-donate will be integral into choosing the best solicitation mechanism.  
However, further exploration of checkout charity mechanisms is needed. There are a few 
important caveats to note about this study. To start, this experiment took place in a lab setting in 
which the donation solicitation is slightly different from checkout charity. While we do not 
expect the main findings of this study to change, it is very possible that the magnitude of effects 
might differ if implemented in the field. For example, with the Rounding method, we might 
expect there to be a fundamental difference between “rounding down” and “rounding up.” 
Additionally, asking people to donate from money earned versus adding on an additional 
donation that increases spending, represents another difference in setting.  
Importantly, real-world situational aspects of the checkout charity setting might interact 
with mechanisms effects. For example, the type of payment used could affect donation rates. 
Increasingly, consumers purchase goods with card versus cash. Do loose-change effects exist if 
consumers pay with card or cash? Does payment type effect a consumer’s underlying 
willingness-to-donate? Thus, further exploration is needed to determine if there are potential 
interaction effects between solicitation and purchase structure. 
As checkout charity has seen a rapid uptake in use, this paper addresses a paucity in the 
economics literature by examining the efficacy of such programs, best practices of 
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implementation, and measurement of the behavioral mechanisms at hand. This paper has opened 
new pathways for experiments in charitable donations in both the laboratory and field. Future 
work will address framing effects of rounding up versus rounding down, loose-change effects, 
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Chapter 2: On the Design of Fundraising Campaigns: goal setting 





Using a laboratory experiment, I study key aspects of fundraising campaigns that utilize 
goals or provision points that must be met in order to provide a good or service. In particular, I 
compare campaigns characterized by a final goal only, an intermediate goal and a known final 
goal, and a third setting where the final goal is known only if the intermediate goal is reached. 
Across these three settings, I vary whether an individual’s payoff from reaching a goal is uncertain 
or certain, which is intended to capture the effects of providing vague or precise information on 
the good or service to be provided. I find that the addition of an intermediate goal decreases the 
likelihood of reaching the final goal. Moreover, the level of the intermediate goal (holding payoffs 
for reaching the goal fixed) has no discernible effect on whether the intermediate or final goal is 
reached. This suggests a possible strategy whereby the campaign designer includes a final goal as 
a decoy in order to reach the desired “intermediate” goal. Value uncertainty has a negative 
significant effect on the likelihood of reaching the goal when only one goal is present. Finally, 






With technological advancements leading to an increasing number of online crowdfunding 
platforms, such as Kickstarter and GoFundMe, there are now relatively low barriers to 
implementing a fundraising campaign. Consequently, there has been a proliferation in the number 
of fundraising campaigns as well as the number of people and organizations engaged in 
fundraising. Importantly, campaign architects face numerous choices related to fundraising design. 
For example, the number of campaign goals and their levels, the timing of when these goals are 
revealed, and whether precise information about the good or service to be funded is provided could 
all impact contribution behavior. This is especially true in crowdsourced fundraising where 
potential donors have real time information on funds raised and individual donors can make 
multiple contributions. However, there is little causal evidence on how these choices affect the 
success of fundraising efforts. To help fill this knowledge gap, I use a laboratory experiment to 
investigate two key issues faced by the designers of online fundraising campaigns – goal setting 
and information provision – using a real-time, continuous donation interface that typifies online 
campaigns. 
Many fundraising campaigns make use of goals, in particular, provision points that must 
be reached in order for a good or service to be provided. However, where should a goal be set? 
And is it better to use a single goal or multiple goals? Multiple goals are commonly used by 
nonprofit organizations and online platforms such as Kickstarter but less common on websites like 
GoFundMe. In addition, “stretch” goals could be introduced during the campaign, perhaps as a 
strategic move, whereby the campaign designer extends the campaign past the initial goal to a new, 
higher funding goal (and associated good provision) that was not announced at the beginning of 
the campaign. 
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While we might think of provision point mechanisms in the context of providing public 
goods, many private goods are supported through fundraising campaigns. Examples range from a 
non-profit organization soliciting donations to feed hungry families to individuals and 
entrepreneurs crowdfunding to raise capital for a new board game startup through websites such 
as GoFundMe, Kickstarter, and Indigo. Yet, there may be discretion on the quality of the good, 
which in turn alters the goal. However, strategies on determining provision points may be context 
specific. In the case of a nonprofit organization, the provision point is likely to reflect the actual 
cost of providing a good or service. For instance, a university might decide on two possible 
provision points to fundraise for a new library: a lower provision point to renovate an existing 
library and a higher provision point to build a new one. For entrepreneurs raising capital on 
Kickstarter, the provision point(s) might not only cover the cost of product development but, 
moreover, a profit margin, the latter amount being discretionary. An entrepreneur may strategically 
set the goal low in order to capture market share, or to hook consumers with a base model before 
bringing a more profitable version to market.  
As another consideration, the value of the good or service produced upon reaching a 
campaign goal may be uncertain. This is to be expected for a new market good, but also is likely 
to characterize many public goods with which donors have little experience or where there is little 
transparency. Importantly, information provision is at the discretion of the campaign designer. For 
instance, an aspiring artist on Kickstarter can reduce uncertainty by providing one song for free 
from a proposed album. Similarly, a university raising funds for a new library can release a video 
or architectural rendering of the proposed structure. But, is providing better information conducive 
to fundraising success? 
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To investigate whether campaign design structures have an impact on the amount raised 
and the likelihood of provision, I design and implement a controlled laboratory experiment. I focus 
on a setting where the campaign designer fundraises for a discrete good that may be provided at 
intermediate levels and may influence ex ante uncertainty over values through information 
provision. Specifically, I compare treatments characterized by the goal structure and whether 
valuations are certain or uncertain. Within each treatment there are multiple scenarios that vary the 
goal(s) while holding valuations fixed, which allows us to provide insight on the tradeoffs of 
strategically altering provision points. In terms of goal structure, I compare settings with one 
provision point (i.e., a final goal), two provision points (i.e., an intermediate and a final goal) that 
are ex ante known, and two provision points where the final is known only if the intermediate goal 
is reached. For treatments with goal uncertainty, some of the scenarios introduce uncertainty over 
whether there is a second goal. To parallel field conditions, I implement a real-time contribution 
game where players are free to make multiple contributions and are continuously updated on the 
success of the fundraising campaign while campaign is in effect.  
This paper expands the existing literature related to the private provision of public goods 
in the context of multiple thresholds, value uncertainty, and threshold uncertainty. I am the first to 
combine these relevant aspects of campaign design to best study dynamic fundraising. While 
previous research has investigated each of these design elements with simultaneous or sequential 
decision-making, no paper has combined multiple popularized elements of campaign design to 
study contribution behavior in a dynamic setting. In this way, I am able to provide insight on some 
fundraising best practices. 
I find that the addition of an intermediate goal decreases the likelihood of meeting the final 
goal. This result holds in treatments with uncertainty over the final goal. However, uncertainty 
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over the final goal does have a positive significant effect on contributions when the value of 
reaching the goal is certain. Finally, Value uncertainty has a negative significant effect on 
provision likelihood in the One Goal treatment, but no effect on average contributions. 
Although there is a large experimental literature on the private provision of public goods, 
there are only a handful of studies that examine the case of multiple provision points. Bagnoli and 
Lipman (1989) formally modelled settings where a public good is provided if and only if 
contributions meet or exceed a certain threshold/goal. Since then, few papers have investigated 
contribution behavior in multiple threshold public goods games. Bagnoli et al. (1992) launched 
the first experimental investigation into multiple provision points with few follow up papers 
(Chewning et al. 2001; Normann and Rau 2015; Hashim et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2016). In their 
investigations, both Bagnoli et al. (1992) and Chewning et al. (2001) conclude that introducing 
multiple thresholds leads to confusion and coordination failure, often reducing overall 
contributions relative to the single threshold case.  
However, differences in refund rules and choice architectures could also account for these 
results. For example, Chewning et al. (2001) only include a refund rule for failing to reach the first 
goal, thereby inducing additional risk and uncertainty over the possibility of meeting additional 
goals. Further, in both studies, participants simultaneously and independently make a single 
contribution decision.26 I introduce a real-time dynamic contribution structure whereby donors are 
able to contribute as much and as often as they want within the given period. 
There have been some investigations into real-time decision games (continuous time) 
across different game designs. Dorsey (1992) was the first to study the impact of real-time 
 
26 In a single threshold case, participants make 1 decision where there is 1 symmetric equilibrium. Introducing 
multiple thresholds introduces multiple equilibria, possibly leading to confusion as Bagnoli, Ben-David, and McKee 
(1992) conclude. 
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donations finding that continuous time does increase contributions to public goods in a voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM) with a provision point.27 Additional studies generally conclude 
that real-time contributions exceed those from a standard simultaneous choice setting ((Goren et 
al. 2003; Goren et al. 2004; Duffy et al. 2007; Choi et al. 2008). Most closely related, Choi et al. 
(2008) use a single provision point game to study simultaneous vs. sequential decision settings 
with multiple periods and find that as the number of contribution rounds increases, provision of 
the public good increases. Therefore, I expect the introduction of dynamic real-time game play to 
increase the likelihood of provision. 
Some papers have examined threshold uncertainty it in provision point games (Wit and 
Wilke 1998; Suleiman et al. 2001). The stylized fact from this literature is that threshold 
uncertainty reduces the rate and intensity of cooperative behavior, decreasing contributions 
(Boucher and Bramoullé 2010; Chen et al. 1996; Nitzan and Romano 1990). However, theoretical 
work by McBride (2006) addresses the potentially non-monotonic relationship between threshold 
uncertainty and coordination. If the value of the good is sufficiently high, uncertainty increases 
equilibrium contributions. Therefore, is difficult to assume the effect of threshold uncertainty in 
the case of multiple provision points. One could expect an uncertain second goal to reduce overall 
contributions, similar to previous literature. Alternatively, the uncertainty could induce higher 
contributions, to “unlock” or reveal the certain value of the second goal upon reaching the first. 
Due to these potentially competing effects, I develop a simple model to form predictions on how 
individuals respond to uncertainty over the second goal.  
Additionally, previous research on uncertainty over the value(s) of a public good is limited 
to linear voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) games (Gangadharan and Nemes 2009; Levati 
 
27 Only in the case where subjects were allowed to increase or decrease their contributions. 
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et al. 2009).  By changing either the marginal per-capita return (MPCR) from donating to the public 
good or the marginal value of money kept, uncertainty has little to no effect on contributions 
(Levati et al. 2009; Levati and Morone 2013; Gangadharan and Nemes 2009). However, in a linear 
VCM, the uncertainty is multiplicative (i.e., uncertainty increases with contributions), whereas in 
the provision point case it is natural to model the uncertainty over the value of the discrete good 
as additive. Therefore, it is unclear whether the impact of value uncertainty can be inferred from 
this literature. The effects of value uncertainty might mirror the effects of threshold uncertainty. 
In this case, it seems likely that uncertainty will have no effect on a risk neutral individual, while 
decreasing overall contributions for a risk averse individual.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
 To gain insight on behavior in the experiment, and to formulate testable hypotheses, I use 
a simple two-player model, where both players choose contributions simultaneously. In doing so, 
I extend the model of Menezes et al. (2001) to introduce multiple thresholds and value uncertainty 
using an approach by Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). While this abstracts from complications of the 
real-time contribution setting with additional players, the main comparative statics results in the 
simple framework are likely to extend. Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of the real-time 
contribution game, it is difficult to model the interactive structure of the game without imposing 
significant simplifying assumptions. Further, any model trying to capture dynamic elements of 
game play would be unlikely to reveal any solvable best-response functions. The model used by 





Each player is given an endowment of 𝜔 and can contribute some amount, x, to fund the 
public good. The good will be provided if contributions reach some goal, 𝑡. If contributions fall 
short of the goal, all individual contributions are refunded to the individual players. Provision of 
the good results in a payout of 𝑣 to each member of the group. The payout is not dependent on the 
relative contribution of a particular player, or whether the player contributes at all. 
The probability that the good is provided, 𝑃(𝑥1, 𝑥2), depends on the contributions of player 
one, 𝑥1, and contributions of player two, 𝑥2. Because the good is only provided if the goal 𝑡 is met, 
the probability of provision is equal to: 
(1) 𝑃(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = {
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 < 𝑡
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≥ 𝑡
 
In this model, any contributions in excess of the goal 𝑡 are refunded to players one and two in 
proportion to each individual’s share of total contributions.28 Thus player one and two’s best 
response functions are 
(2) 𝑥1(𝑥2) = 𝑡 − 𝑥2 
and 
(3) 𝑥2(𝑥1) = 𝑡 − 𝑥1, 
where 𝑣 − 𝑥1 > 0 and 𝑣 − 𝑥2 > 0 for player’s one and two respectively. As long as player one 
believes player two will contribute some amount such that the net benefit of contributing is still 
positive, player one will contribute. Therefore, there many possible equilibria defined by levels 
 
28 In the experiment, contributions cannot exceed the threshold, thus 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 is always strictly less than or equal to 𝑡. 
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of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 that are sufficient to reach the threshold. However, there exist many combinations 
of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 where the good is not provided, 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 < 𝑡. 
 
Two-Goal Case 
 The two-goal setting where there is an intermediate and a final goal, can be characterized 
as a two single goal games played sequentially. Here, I can assume that a player makes decisions 
in the first stage in isolation of the second stage. Each goal had a different payout, 𝑣𝐼 and 𝑣𝐹. The 
payout for reaching the final goal is higher than the payout for reaching the intermediate goal. 
Therefore, in a two-goal case where 𝑣𝐹 = 𝑣 and final goal 𝑡𝐹 = 𝑡, the best-response functions of 
player one and player two are the same as the one-goal case.29 Thus, there should be no significant 
difference in likelihood of provision at the final goal between treatments with one and two goals. 
This prediction is consistent with Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). 
 
Value Uncertainty 
 Now assume there is one goal, and the value of the good is uncertain prior to provision. 
The payout for reaching the goal can now be one of two values, 𝑣1 or 𝑣2, each with a 50% 
probability. Thus, the expected value of the payoff is equal to 𝐸[𝑣] =
1
2
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2). Assuming 
players are risk neutral, and that 𝐸[𝑣] = 𝑣, the best response functions are the same as before. 
However, if at least one player is sufficiently risk averse, then their expected utility in the 
case where the payout is uncertain is strictly less than 
1
2
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2) = 𝑣. Therefore, a risk averse 
player’s best response, will always be less than that of a risk neutral player when uncertainty over 
 
29 Proof in Appendix B. 
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the value exists. Thus, the goal is less likely to be funded if at least one player in the group is 
sufficiently risk averse. Because the expected net benefits of contributing decrease as the expected 
utility of providing the good decreases, players will be less likely to contribute. 
 
Goal Uncertainty 
 Introducing ex ante uncertainty in the second goal substantively changes the decision 
strategies. In this game design, the exact final goal is not revealed until the intermediate goal is 
met. Meeting the intermediate goal unlocks information in the game (the exact cost of the second 
goal), regardless of whether a player then engages in contribution decision-making to meet the 
final goal. Therefore, we can think of revealing the certain final goal as unlocking an option value. 
Players derive utility from the option of unlocking the exact cost of meeting the second goal after 
meeting the first goal. 
Using backwards induction, I first find the best response functions for the second threshold, 
then, based on these, formulate best response functions for the first goal.30 By incorporating the 
expected value of meeting the second goal into the first decision stage, the expected utility of 
meeting the intermediate goal has increased, making it more likely that the intermediate goal is 
met when the final goal is uncertain. Therefore, goal uncertainty increases the probability the good 
is funded at the intermediate goal relative to the certain goal case.  
 
Interaction between goal uncertainty and value uncertainty 
 Incorporating value uncertainty into a model with secondary goal uncertainty yields an 
ambiguous effect on public good provision and contributions. On one hand, value uncertainty 
 
30 Please refer to Appendix B for details. 
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should have a negative effect on contributions if at least one player is risk averse. However, goal 
uncertainty should have a positive effect on contributions if the expected value of the good at the 
second goal is sufficiently high. Our model is unable to determine the magnitude of either effect, 




Participants are randomly matched into groups of four, with 4 to 6 groups per session. 
Participants remain in the same group for the entire experiment, which consists of 15 or 16 
scenarios (i.e., separate fundraising campaigns) depending on the treatment. The order in which 
the scenarios are encountered randomly varies across groups. 
A decision period (scenario) proceeds as follows. Each participant is endowed with 8 
tokens.31 They then have the opportunity to contribute any or all of their tokens towards a group 
“project”. Any tokens not contributed are theirs to keep. Each project has one goal (a final goal) 
or two goals (an intermediate and a final goal) that must be reached for project provision. If a 
group contributes enough tokens to reach a goal, all members of the group receive the same payout. 
In treatments with two goals, the group receives a payout for reaching either goal. However, the 
payout is larger for reaching the final versus the intermediate goal. Across all scenarios, if only the 
intermediate goal is reached, the payout to each group member is 5 tokens. If the final goal is 
reached, each participant receives 10 tokens.32 While the payouts are fixed, the goals vary across 
scenarios. This means that the net benefits and the marginal incentives for contributing towards a 
 
31 All money amounts are denominated in tokens with a conversion rate of 10 tokens to 1 US dollar. 
32 To be clear, these payouts are not additive: the payout for the final goal is not in addition to the payout for the 
intermediate goal. 
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goal also varies. In all scenarios, reaching the final goal results in the efficient (i.e. group payoff-
maximizing) outcome.  
Contributions are only binding if a goal is met. Otherwise, any contributions towards an 
unattained goal are fully refunded. To be clear, in treatments with two goals, refunds are 
implemented as follows: (1) if the intermediate goal is not met, all contributions are refunded to 
contributors, (2) if only the intermediate goal is met, all contributions made after this goal was 
reached are refunded. Using refunds lowers the risk associated with contributing tokens and 
increases the likelihood of meeting the final goal. The software is programmed such that a person 
cannot contribute more than what is needed to meet the (next) goal. 
In treatments with uncertainty over the final goal, participants do not know the exact goal 
at the start of the round. Instead, they are shown two possible values of the goal, and each has an 
equal chance of being selected. In these treatments, the computer randomly selects a value for the 
final goal, and only reveals this value to the group when the intermediate goal is reached. In some 
scenarios, one of the possible values is “no goal”, which reflects a setting where it is unknown 
whether the campaign organizer will introduce a “stretch” goal.  
 Similarly, in treatments with value uncertainty, participants know the payout(s) for 
reaching a goal could be one of two possible amounts, each with a 50% chance. For all scenarios, 
the payout for only reaching the intermediate goal only is either 3 or 7 tokens, and the payout for 
reaching the final goal is either 8 or 12 tokens. Thus, the expected value of reaching the 
intermediate or final goals are 5 and 10 tokens respectively, allowing for comparisons between the 
parallel treatments with certain values. The actual payout is only revealed at the end of the round. 
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I implement six treatments using a 3x2 between-subjects design, as depicted in Table 2.1.33 
There are three goal structures, which allows me to make comparisons between settings with one 
versus two goals, and two-goal structures with and without uncertainty over the final goal. 
Additionally, I vary whether values are certain or uncertain. Note that in the two-goal treatments 
with certain values, the values of the good at both goals are known, regardless of whether or not a 
goal is uncertain.34 In treatments with value uncertainty, the value of the good remains uncertain 
until the end of the round, regardless of whether any goals are met during the contribution phase.  
Parameters for each scenario and each treatment are detailed in Table 2.2. With these 
parameters I am able to make many meaningful comparisons both within and between treatments. 
For example, Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 in the single-goal treatments (T1 and T4) can be compared to 
Scenarios 4, 6, and 8 in the two goal treatment where both goals are pre-announced (T2 and T5); 
in all these cases, the final goal equals 12 tokens. Similarly, to compare the effects of goal 
uncertainty, we can compare Scenario 4 for T2 and T5 treatment with Scenario 2 and Scenario 5 
for the two goal treatments where the final goal is uncertain (T3 and T6). The intermediate goals 
are identical across these scenarios, as are the (expected) level of the final goal. Finally, I introduce 
an additional case of uncertainty in the last eight scenarios of T3 and T6. Here the uncertainty is 
over whether there is a final goal. In particular, there is a 50% chance that the final goal will be a 
known value and a 50% chance that there is no final goal. This captures uncertainty over whether 
there is going to be a “stretch” goal.  
 
 
33 All tables and figures for Chapter 2 are located in Appendix B. 
34 While this design choice may abstract from reality, this allows a cleaner comparison between the one and two-
threshold cases. Not revealing the value of the good at the second goal would imply ambiguity rather than 
uncertainty. 
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Testable hypotheses and power analysis 
This experimental design allows me to test hypotheses related to the likelihood of provision 
and group contributions. These hypotheses stem from predictions derived from the theoretical 
framework, and from prior experimental work.  
Hypothesis 1. Group contributions, and the likelihood of reaching the final goal, decrease as 
the goal (provision point) increases. 
Hypothesis 2. Group contributions, and the likelihood of reaching the final goal, are the same 
in the one-goal treatments and the two-goal treatments, when all goals are known at the 
start of the campaign.  
Hypothesis 3. If players are risk averse, value uncertainty decreases the likelihood of reaching 
a goal. 
Hypothesis 4. If the net benefit of reaching a goal is sufficiently high, an uncertain final goal 
increases the likelihood that the intermediate goal is reached, relative to the certain goal 
case.  
For Hypotheses 1, as the goal 𝑡 increases, the expected net value of reaching the goal 
decreases. Therefore, the likelihood of funding the public good decreases as 𝑡 increases (as does 
contributions, on average). Hypothesis 1 holds in cases with one or two goals where the final goal 
in a two-goal case is equal to 𝑡. Hypothesis 2 stems from the theoretical framework, as well as 
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). If 𝑣 = 𝑣F and  𝑡 = 𝑡F in treatments with known goals, average 
contributions as well as the likelihood of provision will not be significantly different between 
treatments with one and two goals. For Hypothesis 3, introducing uncertainty lowers the expected 
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utility of contributing for risk-averse individuals relative to certain value treatments. Therefore, 
the likelihood of funding the public good will be lower relative to the certain case in both 
treatments. Finally, for Hypothesis 4, in treatments where the final goal is uncertain, players gain 
additional utility from the option value of reaching the intermediate goal, increasing the expected 
utility of meeting the intermediate goal. Therefore, the likelihood of meeting the intermediate goal 
increases with final goal uncertainty as along as the net benefit of reaching a goal is sufficiently 
high. 
To determine sample sizes, I conducted a paid pilot experiment with 24 participants using 
T2. In my power calculations, I assume that the estimated within and between-subject variances 
from the pilot session are representative of all treatments. Moreover, I assume that tests are based 
on a linear regression model with standard errors clustered at the group-level. Based on 
calculations using 80% power and 5% significance level, this led to a target sample size of 15 
groups per treatment. This allows one to detect a minimum effect size of 11 percentage points 
when testing whether two treatments have the same likelihood of reaching a fundraising goal, and 
a minimum detectable effect size of 0.5 tokens when comparing contributions. 
 
Participants and procedures 
Three-hundred and sixty-four undergraduate students participated in the experiment during 
the Fall of 2019 and Spring of 2020. All sessions were conducted in a designated experimental 
economics laboratory, and participants were recruited from an existing subject pool. The pool 
resembles the general population of students with respect to gender, age, etc. In total, there are 
nineteen sessions with an average of 20 participants per session. Sessions lasted approximately 90 
minutes and individual earnings averaged $23.73.  
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Decisions were entered on networked computers using a program coded with the software 
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Written instructions were provided to participants, which were read 
aloud by the same moderator in each session.  
The experiment included three separate tasks. First, participants faced a multiple-price-list 
risk elicitation procedure popularized by Holt and Laury (2002). This was followed by a practice 
round before moving onto the main experiment in which subjects participate in 15 or 16 decision 
rounds (scenarios) of the contributions game. The experiment concluded with a post-experiment 
questionnaire. Representative instructions and computer screenshots are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Results 
 Table 2.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for participants. Of the 364 participants, 
58.6% are male and the average age is 20. The risk elicitation task suggests that 51.9% of 
participants can be characterized as risk averse. On average, groups reached the intermediate goal 
98.3% of the time while groups reached the final goal 81.5% of the time.  
Figure 2.1 shows the final goal success rate by treatment. The largest difference between 
treatments occurs when comparing the One Goal treatment with certain values (T1) to the Two 
Goals, Known treatment with certain values (T2), which differ by 19 percentage points. In 
treatments with certain values (light grey), the inclusion of an intermediate goal significantly 
lowers the likelihood of reaching the final goal by approximately 18 percentage points.  
In treatments with uncertain values, the inclusion of an intermediate goal only significantly 
lowers the likelihood of reaching the final goal when the final goal is certain.35 Participants in the 
Two Goals, Known treatment are less likely to reach the final goal that those in the Two Goals, 
 
35 The difference in funding rates between the One Goal treatment and the Two Goals, 2nd Unknown is not 
statistically significant when the value of reaching the goal is uncertain. 
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2nd Unknown treatment. Thus, the interaction of goal uncertainty and value uncertainty has a 
positive impact on provision. While this result is counter to Hypothesis 2, it is consistent with 
previous literature that finds multiple goals decreases the likelihood of provision at a higher level 
(Bagnoli et al. 1992; Chewning et al. 2001).  
 Comparing the two-goal treatments with and without goal uncertainty, I find no significant 
difference in the likelihood of reaching the final goal when the goal is certain versus uncertain. 
This effect is present in treatments with value certainty and value uncertainty. Final goal success 
rates between these two-goal structures range between 74-80%. 
Value uncertainty only has a significant effect in the One Goal treatment. Here value 
uncertainty decreases the likelihood of reaching the final goal. However, this effect does not persist 
in treatments with two goals. When two goals are present, there is no significant difference in the 
final goal success rate between treatments with certain and uncertain values. 
 Figure 2.2 shows total group contributions by treatment. Comparing treatments with certain 
values, contributions are significantly lower in the Two Goals, Known treatment than the One 
Goal, consistent with hypothesis 2. Additionally, the Two Goals, Known treatment with certain 
values induces significantly lower group contributions than the Two Goals, 2nd Unknown treatment 
with certain values. Thus, goal uncertainty seems to have a positive effect on group contributions, 
consistent with hypothesis 4. There is no significant differences in group contributions between 
the One Goal and Two Goals, 2nd Unknown treatments with value certainty. 
 There are no significant differences between treatments when values are certain versus 
uncertain. Therefore, value uncertainty has no effect on group level contributions within goal 
structures. In treatments with uncertain values, contributions are significantly lower in treatments 
with two goals compared with the one-goal treatment. 
57 
 
Group Contributions  
 I now turn to a formal econometric analysis of group-level contributions. Here, group 
contributions refers to the intended number of tokens contributed by the group before any refunds 
are processed. To do this, I analyze the experimental panel data using a linear regression model. 
To account for correlation across the multiple scenarios undertaken by a particular group, standard 
errors are clustered at the group level. Table 2.4 displays two regression models. In both, indicators 
associated with treatments T2 to T6 are included such that their coefficients measure differences 
from the baseline T1, the One Goal treatment with certain values. Model 1 utilizes only treatment 
indicators whereas Model 2 includes participant characteristics. Additionally, I control for order 
effects by including four indicator variables for the four randomized scenario orders. 
 In treatments with certain values, participants in T2 (two goals) contribute significantly 
less than participants in T1 (one goal). On average, participants in the T2 treatment contribute 
1.174 tokens less than those in the T1 treatment. This result is counter to Hypothesis 2. The 
difference in contributions between T1 and T3 (Two Goals, Uncertain final goal) is negative but 
not statistically significant. T2 and T3 are not significantly different (p < 0.12). When values are 
uncertain, using a two-goal structure decreases contributions (T5 versus T4, p < 0.002; T6 versus 
T4, p < 0.05). There is no statistical difference between the two-goal treatments with value 
uncertainty (T5 and T6) (p < 0.29). These statistical results are robust to inclusion of additional 
control variables, as suggested by Model 2.  
 In model 2, value uncertainty now has a significant negative effect on total group 
contributions when there is only one goal.36 On average, participants contribute 0.277 tokens less 
 
36 Significant at the 10%. 
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when values are uncertain. Additionally, from this model, there is evidence that risk aversion is 
negatively correlated with contributions. 
 Table 2.5 reports regression results testing how contributions vary according to the specific 
level of the final and/or intermediate goals, and further allow direct tests of the effects of inducing 
value uncertainty. Separate regressions are estimated for each goal structure.  In these regressions 
I include the magnitude of the intermediate and final goals, an indicator for value uncertainty, and 
an indicator for whether “No Goal Possible” was an option in the Two Goals, 2nd Unknown 
treatment.37 
 Increasing the final goal leads to a significant increase in total contributions across all goal 
structures. This result is interesting as it suggests that, while one is potentially lowering the chance 
of provision by increasing the goal, this effect is not strong enough to offset the additional 
contributions obtained from this adjustment. For example, in the one-goal treatments, increasing 
the final goal by one token leads to an increase of 0.952 tokens contributed. This is almost a one-
to-one relationship. However, the effect size is significantly lower in the two-goal treatments. This 
might be unsurprising consider the results shown in Figure 2.1.  
 Additionally, the magnitude of the intermediate goal has a statistically significant effect on 
total contributions in the Two Goals, Known treatment, meaning that a higher intermediate goal 
increases total group contributions by 0.129 tokens. However, the magnitude of the intermediate 
goal does not have a significant effect on group contributions in the Two Goals, 2nd Unknown 
treatments.  
 
37 In these rounds, participants were given two possible outcomes for the final goal which included the possibility 
that there would not be a final goal (with a 50% chance). Scenarios shown here only the ones in which “No Goal 
Possible” was not selected and participants had the option of reaching a final goal. 
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 For all three goal structures, there is no statistically significant effect of value uncertainty 
on group contributions. However, in the Two Goals, 2nd Unknown treatment, No Goal Possible 
has a significant negative effect on group contributions. If participant was faced with the 
uncertainty of even having a final goal, they contributed 1.258 tokens less on average than those 
in the same treatment that had a certain option of having a final goal. 
 
Final Goal Provision 
Tables 6 and 7 parallel the regression analyses in Tables 4 and 5, respectively, but use an 
indicator of whether the final goal was reached as the outcome variable of interest (i.e., reported 
are linear probability models). Discussing insights from Table 2.6 first, participants in all 
treatments were significantly less likely to reach the final goal relative to the baseline treatment, 
One Goal with certain values (T1). The largest difference between treatments occurs when 
comparing the One-Goal treatment to the Two Goals, Known treatment (T2) with an 18.7 
percentage point decrease in the likelihood of reaching the final goal.  
Comparing both Two Goal treatments reveals no significant difference in success rates 
with between either certain or uncertain value treatments (T2 versus T3, p < 0.79; T5 versus T6, p 
< 0.46). In treatments with uncertain values, there is a significant difference between the One Goal 
(T4) and Two Goals, Known treatment (T5), meaning participants in T5 were less likely to reach 
the final goal than those in T4 (p < 0.045). This is inconsistent with hypothesis 4, but in line with 
previous literature.  
Model 2 shows consistent magnitudes and significance across all treatment indicator 
variables. Additionally, both the gender of a participant and their relative risk aversion have 
significant negative effects on the likelihood of meeting the final goal. If a group is made up of all 
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males, they are 17.5 percentage points less likely to reach the final goal than a group that is all 
female. Similarly, if a group is made up of all risk averse players, then the groups is 19 percentage 
points less likely to reach the final goal than a group consists of all risk neutral players. 
 Table 2.7 is much like Table 2.5, but here the dependent variable is whether the final goal 
was reached or not. For all treatments, as the magnitude of the final goal increases, the likelihood 
of reaching that goal decreases. This magnitude of this coefficient is much smaller in the One Goal 
treatment (0.9 percentage points) relative to the two goal treatments (~5.3 percentage points). The 
magnitude of the intermediate goal has no significant effect on the likelihood of meeting the final 
goal. 
 Value uncertainty has a negative significant effect on the likelihood of meeting the final 
goal in the One Goal treatment, as we saw in Figure 2.1. Value uncertainty has no significant effect 
in either of the two goal treatments. Finally, “No Goal Possible” has a negative significant effect, 
lowering the likelihood of reaching the final goal by 12.9 percentage points. 
 
Intermediate Goal Provision 
 To test Hypothesis 4, that the intermediate goal is more likely to be met in cases with goal 
uncertainty, I regress an indicator for whether the intermediate goal was met on treatment 
indicators. These results are displayed in Table 2.8. Again, model 1 includes only treatment 
dummies whereas model 2 includes participant and order controls. Additionally, the baseline is 
again, the One Goal treatment with certain values (T1). 
I fail to reject that, jointly, all treatment indicators are statistically different from zero (p = 
0.20). Thus, there is no variation in this outcome across the four treatments with intermediate goals. 
From the raw data, this result is not unexpected as the intermediate goal was reached in virtually 
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all cases, with little variation across treatments. However, it is worth noting, that in treatments with 
final goal uncertainty where the option “no final goal” was a possibility, groups met the 
intermediate goal 100% of the time. 
Table 2.9 is similar to Tables 2.5 and 2.7. I regress the magnitudes of both goals, an 
indicator for value uncertainty, and an indicator for whether the final goal was possible. Neither 
goal magnitudes have a significant effect on the likelihood that an intermediate goal is met. 
Additionally, neither value uncertainty nor “No Goal Possible” has an effect on the likelihood of 
meeting the intermediate goal. Thus, I reject hypothesis 4, finding that goal uncertainty has no 
effect on the likelihood of meeting the intermediate goal. 
 
Individual Behavior 
 It is possible that the preceding group-level analyses mask important differences within 
groups. To investigate heterogeneity in individual-level behavior, I next analyze a measure of 
within-group variation in contributions. Specifically, I define a variance measure for donor 𝑖 in 
group 𝑔 and scenario 𝑠 as the squared deviation from the average contributions from the group in 
this same scenario: 
 




Regressions with this variance measure as the dependent variable are displayed in Table 2.10. 
Similar to Tables 2.4 and 2.6, model 1 consists of treatment indicators where T1 is the baseline 
treatment and model 2 incorporates those same treatment indicators along with demographic 
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characteristics and controls for order effects. In models 1 and 2, we observe no significant effect 
of any independent variable on individual contribution variance within a group. 
Table 2.11, however, shows that increasing the final goal magnitude increases individual 
contribution variance. The effect on individual contribution variance is largest in the treatment 
with Two Goals, Known with an increase of 0.260 and almost twice the size of the effect in the 
One Goal treatment. The magnitude of the intermediate goal has no effect on individual 
contribution variance. Interestingly, in the Two Goals, Known treatment, value uncertainty leads 
to a large significant decrease in variance.  
 
Dynamics 
 Figure 2.3 reports mean group contributions by treatment across all 15 decision rounds in 
the experiment. In previous experiments, participants often learn over multiple periods, lowering 
the likelihood of reaching the goal as the experiment progresses (Chewning et al. 2001). However, 
I do not observe this behavior, as group contributions are relatively stable across all treatments as 
participants progress through the experiment. 
 While Figure 2.3 pools observations across the different goal structures, Figure 2.4 
provides a breakdown of all six treatments and group contributions over periods. Here again, I do 
not observe any sign of learning at the aggregate level. Thus, participants’ contribution behavior 
is at best very weakly correlated with behavior from the previous round.38 
I do, however, observe changes in behavioral dynamics across all 15 periods. Figure 2.5 
shows the average time in which groups meet the final goal by period. Beginning in period 1, 
groups across all treatments reach the goal in around 74 seconds. However, over the next 5 periods, 
 
38 This finding is consistent with results from the pilot session, where the fraction of the overall variance attributable 
to differences in group-level behavior over decision periods was just 0.02. 
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this time increases to an average of 104 seconds. For the rest of the experiment, groups meet the 
final goal within the last 20 seconds of the period. This waiting behavior or slow-down in 
contributions might signal some learning on behalf of participants within a group. 
This is further demonstrated by the distribution plot shown in Figure 2.6. Figure 2.6 shows 
the distribution of time in which the final goal is met for all treatments and periods. As shown, 
more than 50% of the time, the final goal is met within the last 5 seconds of the round, signaling 
potential strategic behavior. Groups met the final goal in less than 100 seconds in fewer than 20% 
of all rounds in all treatments. 
A closer examination of within period contributions reveals that participants contribute 
almost 80% of the needed tokens to reach the final goal within the first 60 seconds of the period. 
Figure 2.7 shows the percent of the final goal funded within the 2-minute contribution window. 
As shown, participants spend the last minute of the period waiting to see who will contribute the 
last 10 to 20% of the needed funds.  
Finally, Figure 2.8 shows the time in which the intermediate goal is met across all 4 
treatments with two goals. In three of the treatments, the intermediate goal is met, on average, at 
20-30 seconds into the period. However, in the Two Goals, Known treatment with uncertain 
values, the intermediate goal is met at approximately 12 seconds, on average. This is twice as fast 
as the Two Goals, Known treatments with certain values and indicates that participants randomized 






In this experiment, I test whether key elements of dynamic fundraising campaigns have an 
effect on campaign success. Specifically, I test whether the number of goals, goal uncertainty, and 
value uncertainty have an effect on provision rates using a continuous-time dynamic public goods 
game. Despite the use of a continuous time decision-making environment, and token refunds for 
not meeting the goal, inclusion of an intermediate goal reduces the chance a (final) fundraising 
goal is reached. 
While provision rates in this experiment are exceptionally high (~74%) relative to others 
in this literature, the net benefits to participants from provision in this experiment are comparable 
to that of other provision point games with single and multiple goals, as well as VCM games 
(Chewning et al. 2001; Choi et al. 2008). Thus, I attribute observed high levels of provision to the 
dynamic nature of the game, allowing players continuous information feedback, and the fact that 
contributions are not binding unless a goal is reached. Choi et al. (2008) compare two variants of 
a sequential game (2 rounds vs. 5 rounds) to a one-shot game and find that provision rates increase 
with the number of rounds. Allowing multiple decisions across a contribution window gives group 
participants a chance to signal other members and coordinate within the group, even without a 
designated chat box (Choi et al. 2008). Additionally, their reported provision rates in the two and 
five round sequential games are comparable to the observed high rates of provision in this 
experiment.  
Goal uncertainty has no effect on provision rates but does have a positive effect on 
contributions when the value of the good is certain. While this is in contrast with previous work 
on threshold uncertainty, the design in our experiment is slightly different. In previous studies, 
subjects never learn of the goal until round completion. In our experiment, the goal uncertainty is 
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resolved mid-game as the final goal is known once the intermediate goal is met. Perhaps then it is 
unsurprising that uncertainty resolved during a campaign has no effect on the likelihood of meeting 
the goal but could influence within campaign contribution behavior.  
Value uncertainty has a negative significant effect on reaching the (final) goal in campaigns 
without an intermediate goal but has no effect in treatments with an intermediate goal.  In addition, 
I find value uncertainty has no effect on mean contributions. This could be due to the large group-
level welfare gains to achieving fundraising goals, or the fact that only half of our participants are 
considered risk averse (~52%). Thus, further experimental study of goal structure and dynamic 
fundraising is warranted.  
As more businesses, nonprofits, and individuals engage in dynamic fundraising, it is 
important to investigate best practices and incorporate them into campaign design. These results 
indicate that fundraisers should engage in either of the following goal-setting strategies: (1) set a 
single goal, or (2) if using multiple goals, set the most desired funding level as the first goal. This 
experiment shows that donors tend to default to reaching whatever goal is first. Therefore, the use 
of “stretch” goals is only optimal if the first goal is the primary goal.  
Future work using this real-time and continuous contribution interface might benefit from 
introducing additional variation in the experiment parameters. When determining the parameters 
for the experiment, I relied on net benefit ratios characteristic of related provision point 
experiments. However, I did not anticipate the very high success rates, which far exceed most prior 
studies. Lowering the potential gains from a successful campaign, by decreasing valuations or 
increasing provision points, may reveal additional differences across goal structures. Moreover, 
additional comparisons where the intermediate goal in a two-goal setting is equal to the final goal 
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in a one-goal setting would corroborate our claim that it may be desirable set the intermediate goal 
at the level of the desired fundraising target.  
This paper addresses some important dimensions of dynamic fundraising campaigns 
including goal setting, goal uncertainty, and value uncertainty. However, there are many 
variations in online fundraising campaigns that have yet to be explored including competition, 
ambiguity over the value of the good, and advertising. Future research will investigate current 
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Officer-involved fatalities (OIFs) are on the rise in the United States. According to the 
Washington Post, almost one thousand people were shot and killed by police in 2018 alone. In this 
paper, I examine the effects of officer-involved fatalities, including officer-involved shootings, on 
domestic violence reporting. I conduct this analysis using county and zip code level data to 
understand how concentrated any effects of police violence may be. Using within-county variation, 
I test whether the number of domestic violence reports decreases in the week after a fatal officer-
involved encounter. I find little to no effect of OIFs on domestic violence reporting at the county 
level. However, using zip code-level 911 call data from Memphis, TN, I find some evidence of 
decreased 911 calls for domestic violence in neighborhoods where an officer-involved fatality took 
place. Further, I find that total 911 calls also decrease in affected zip codes and neighborhoods. 





Officer-involved fatalities (OIFs) have increased in the United States over the last decade. 
According to the Washington Post, almost one thousand people were shot and killed by police in 
2018 alone.39 Community reactions to these events have been mixed with some fatalities labeled 
as “justifiable,” and others sparking outrage and protest (Wheelock et al. 2019; Kirk and 
Papachristos 2011). However, little is known about the impact of officer-involved fatalities and 
their effect on community relations. 
Trust between police and community is important for many reasons. It has particular 
economic relevance because that trust is necessary for effective provision of public safety.  Public 
goods like public safety and the enforcement of law can affect the security of property rights, 
personal health, human capital formation, etc. (Demsetz 1964; Desmond et al. 2016; Bor et al. 
2018). However, while all public goods rely to some degree on community engagement and crime 
reporting, this is especially the case with public safety/law enforcement.  
Prior work using case studies suggests police violence may have an effect on crime 
reporting. Cloninger (1991) finds that incidents of police shootings are inversely related to the rate 
of non-homicide violent crime. Similarly, recent work also suggests that police violence erodes 
trust, and those effects are heterogeneous among different populations (Chenane et al. 2019; 
Gingerich and Oliveros 2018; Kirk and Papachristos 2011; Brunson and Miller 2005; Bor et al. 
2018; Cloninger 1991). In a case study of the beating of Frank Jude, results indicate that residents 
of black neighborhoods, relative to white neighborhoods, were subsequently less likely to report 
crime (Desmond et al. 2016). While police violence may affect crime reporting through both 
 
39The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/police-shootings-2018/ 
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mechanisms, the literature has to date only investigated the effects of police violence on total crime 
reporting. 
However, outside of these limited case studies, there is little evidence on whether treatment 
persists over time or whether these affects are limited to a few a select group of officer-involved 
fatalities. Further, no paper has studied the impact of repeated exposure to police violence on crime 
reporting or how widespread the effects are. Therefore, this paper uses a novel dataset to address 
an important question: what is the impact of police violence on crime reporting over time. I utilize 
both county-level panel data as well as zip-code level 911 call data in Tennessee to isolate the 
effects of officer-involved fatalities (OIFs) on crime reporting in both the short and long run (days 
vs. weeks). 
Specifically, I look at the impact of a fatal officer-involved encounter on domestic violence 
reporting. I chose to investigate domestic violence reporting specifically because this type of crime 
involves reporting family members. Victims of domestic violence and abuse might be less inclined 
to report an incident or call for help if there is tangible risk that law enforcement might shoot and 
kill a family member. Because domestic violence is already fraught with underreporting and 
barriers to seeking help, I might be concerned if police violence affects a victim’s willingness to 
report domestic violence.  
However, any noticeable effect might be mitigated by repetition and preestablished 
perceptions of the justice system. For example, it is possible that repetition of police violence 
desensitizes community members to displays of violence. After repeated exposure to police 
violence, an additional OIF might have little to no effect on crime reporting. This might be 
especially true in areas where incidents of police brutality and use of force are frequent.  
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I find little to no effect of OIFs on domestic violence reporting at the county level. However, 
using zip code-level 911 call data from Memphis, TN, I find some evidence of decreased 911 calls 
for domestic violence in neighborhoods where an officer-involved fatality took place. Further, I 
find that total 911 calls also decrease in affected zip codes and neighborhoods. The magnitude of 
the effects is dependent on the race of the OIF victim and cause of death. 
This is the first paper to study the impact of officer-involved fatalities on the reporting of 
domestic violence. Previous research in this area is limited to one incident and/or one municipality. 
In this paper, I use 12 years of reporting data across 95 counties, making me better equipped to 
study the impact of fatal police shootings on crime reporting. One benefit of having so many years 
of data, is that I am able to analyze the effects of police shootings in a time before OIS’s were 
more heavily reported in the media. Additionally, I am the first to use spatial 911 call data in 
multiple municipalities over many years. With this and zip code-level data, I am able to hone in 
on heterogeneous effects across different population groups within cities over time.  
 
Background 
It might not be surprising if officer-involved fatalities impact crime reporting. Recent high-
profile cases of fatal police encounters with unarmed victims such as Walter Scott, Michael Brown, 
and Tamir Rice have led to televised protests and nationwide unrest. While the focus on the 
protests has been on the “racial bias in American policing,” there is reason suspect these incidents 
and others could lead to widespread impacts on trust in the justice system and its enforcers 
(Blinder, 2017).40 Subsequent Department of Justice investigations into high violence police 
 
40 Blinder, A. (2017, December 7). Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 20-Year Sentence. 
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-sentence-walter-scott.html; What Happened 
in Ferguson? (2014, August 13). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-
missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html; and Dewan, S., & Oppel, R. A. (2015, January 23). In Tamir 
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departments have revealed troubling results. Officers often fail to receive adequate training on the 
use of deadly force policy, leading officers to “engage in a pattern or practice of using force, 
including deadly force that is unreasonable” (Justice 2017). However, in police departments across 
the country, complaints warranting investigations are often ignored. This failure to provide 
accountability and justice can further erode public trust in law enforcement and the police 
department’s ability to effectively prevent crime. Per the Justice Department, “trust and 
effectiveness in combating violent crime are inextricable intertwined (Justice 2017).” 
 Equality becomes a concern when minority or low-income citizens are disproportionately 
exposed to police violence. In the Department of Justice’s investigation into the Chicago Police 
Department, raw statistics revealed that the CPD used force almost “ten times more often against 
blacks than against whites.” This disparity in treatment has led to gaps in perceptions of police 
competency and fairness between races (Sigelman et al. 1997; Brunson 2007; Bor et al. 2018). 
Thus, heterogeneous perceptions of police across racial and income groups could impact the effect 
of police violence on citizen crime reporting. 
  In the paper most similar to this, Desmond et al. (2016) find some evidence of this by 
examining the impact of police brutality on 911 calls for service. They find that residents of black 
neighborhoods, relative to white neighborhoods, were less likely to report crime after Frank Jude’s 
beating was broadcast publicly. However, this study is limited to one incident, the beating of Frank 
Jude, and one municipality, Milwaukee, WI. Similarly, the only other paper that utilizes 911 call 
data is Cohen et al. (2019). Using both fatal and non-fatal OIS incidents from Los Angeles County, 
they find no change in total 911 calls-for-service in the 30 days after an incident. Other research 
 




investigating the impacts of police violence utilizes survey data, or in person interviews (Gingerich 
and Oliveros 2018; Carr et al. 2007; Kirk and Papachristos 2011).  
While there are many channels through which police violence may affect crime reporting, 
I focus on two candidate mechanisms: deterrence and trust. The relationship between a community 
and law enforcement is inextricably intertwined with law enforcement’s ability and effectiveness 
in combatting crime (Justice 2017). Incidents of police brutality have the potential to affect a 
community’s perception and trust of its institutions, leading to less crime reporting. On the other 
hand, police brutality could also affect an individual with criminal tendencies and their proclivity 
to commit crimes. The possibility of an aggressive response by law enforcement may deter some 
criminal activity. This, in turn, might lead to lower crime reporting as a result of less criminal 
activity.  
However, it is plausible that reporting of certain crimes is more affected by eroded trust 
than others, while deterrence may dominate for other crimes. For example, deterrence might 
impact robberies, vandalism, theft and other crimes committed with lower penalties. Alternatively 
crimes such as domestic violence and familial disputes might be more impacted by eroded trust 
rather than deterrence (Dunford et al. 1990). To date, no study has looked at the differential effects 
of police violence across different types of crime. If police violence erodes trust, this could further 
reduce crime reporting for already underreported crimes like domestic violence.  
If we assume that police killings affect crime reporting, different mechanisms are likely to 
be more salient for different types of crime. For example, an individual’s proclivity to call the 
police might be impacted by the severity of the crime being committed, who is committing the 
crime (family member or complete stranger), and where the crime is taking place. Focusing on 
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domestic situations, it is possible that perceptions of police aggression might deter reporting in 
situation where the crime is committed by a relative.  
It is unlikely that police violence deters offenders from committing acts of domestic abuse. 
Previous research on domestic violence demonstrates that offenders are not very responsive to 
deterrents such as increased penalties and mandatory arrest policies (Dunford et al. 1990). Most 
states have implemented mandatory arrest policies for domestic situation calls. If officers have 
probable evidence of domestic violence, they are obligated to arrest the aggressive party. However, 
this can also lead to a duel arrest of the both the offender and victim in situations where a victim 
might also demonstrate aggression by fighting back.  
These mandatory arrest policies were implemented for two purposes: to demonstrate that 
domestic violence is a serious crime and perpetrators should face serious consequences through 
the justice system, and because these policies were assumed to have a deterrent effect on repeated 
acts of domestic abuse (Justice 2017). However, numerous studies have demonstrated that this last 
assumption does not hold, especially for victims who are unmarried and whose husbands are 
unemployed. In these situations, domestic violence acts might actually increase (Aizer 2010). 
Further, many studies have found links between poverty and unemployment on domestic abuse 
(Aizer 2011; de Olarte and Llosa 1999). This is also consistent with recent work by Lindo et al. 
(2018), who find that child maltreatment decreases with indicators for male employment but 
increases for female employment. Thus, increases in punitive costs are unlikely to affect an 
abuser’s proclivity to commit crimes. While I cannot separate the differential effects between 
lower crime rates and lower crime reporting in my datasets, the literature suggests that changes in 
domestic violence crime are due to changes in reporting rather than changes in crime rates. 
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 However, there is little known about the factors affecting domestic violence reporting 
outside the household. This paper represents a significant improvement in both literatures on 
domestic violence reporting and police violence. Combining these two literatures, this paper 
addresses how outside factors, such as police violence, affects a victim’s proclivity to report 
domestic abuse or call for help. 
 
Data 
 The data for this study come from three sources: the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s 
reporting website (CrimeInsight), Fatalencounters.org, and 911 calls for service obtained via the 
Freedom of Information Act. I use both the Tennessee crime data on domestic violence reports as 
well as 911 domestic violence calls to measure the impact of police violence on domestic violence 
reporting. The CrimeInsight data represents data generated from a report where charges were filed. 
Importantly, this data is only available at the county level. The 911 call data represents calls for 
help, which may or may not lead to the generation of crime reports. The 911 call data includes the 
address from where the call took place, giving me a more precise measurement of geographic 
effects at the zip code level. 
 
TN Crime Insight Data 
I obtained data on reported domestic violence crimes from the state of Tennessee’s 
CrimeInsight website from 2001-2017.41 This incident-based data is generated from reports filed 
by officers and listed as daily totals by crime type, geography, etc. Unlike the 911 calls-for-service 
 
41 State by year time trends are relatively flat with little variation in total incidents reported per year.  
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data, a report is only generated if an officer is dispatched to the scene, and a report filed. It is quite 
possible then that this data underrepresents the number of crimes taking place. 
TN CrimeInsight categories all domestic violence incidents as “Domestic Situations” 
where there is a “Domestic Violence Victim.” Any report containing this flag is then listed under 
domestic violence reports. Within these reports, I focus on the subset of offense types related to 
Crimes Against Persons.42 Offense types in this category range from stalking and intimidation to 
murder and rape. Figure 3.1 shows domestic violence incidents by offense type using 2018 data 
from TN Crime Insight.43 
In 2018 alone, there were over 40,000 simple assaults, 9000 aggravated assaults, and 7,000 
acts of intimidation reported. Simple assaults, the most common offense type, is classified as a 
misdemeanor. Aggravated assault, while less frequent, is a felony. However, domestic violence 
incidents are not always limited to a single offense/charge. For example, an alleged perpetrator 
can be charged with both aggravated assault and rape for the same incident. As a result, considering 
all types of offenses could result in the double-counting of domestic violence incidents. Therefore, 
I limit my analysis to two types of offenses, Simple Assaults and All Assaults (a combination of 
both simple and aggravated assaults).  
I do this for multiple reasons. First, these two offense types are the most frequently reported 
and make up a vast majority of all domestic violence incidents. Second, assault of any type is 
usually categorized into either of these categories depending on the severity of the crime. Thus, I 
am much less likely to double count incidents when I limit my analysis to simple and aggravated 
assaults. 
 
42 Other offense types include Crimes Against Property and Crimes Against Society. 
43 All figures and tables for Chapter 3 are located in Appendix C. 
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More descriptive statistics for Simple and All Assaults can be found in Table 3.1 along 
with county-level economic data. There is an average of 256 Simple Assaults per county per year 
in TN. Of these assaults, 81 percent of the victims are white, and 18 percent are black. For All 
Assaults (simple and aggravated), there is an average of 376 incidents per county per year. 56 
percent of these victims are white, 11 percent are black, and 33 percent are not racially identified. 
Across all counties in Tennessee, the Labor Force Participation rate is 44 percent with 40.6 percent 
of individuals classified as employed and 3.3 percent as unemployed. 
Figure 3.2 shows domestic violence assaults (simple and aggravated) per 1000 residents 
by county. Here, I can see that domestic violence incidents are not limited to urban areas, but rather 
dispersed through both urban and rural areas. Shelby county has the most assaults per 1000 
residents with 331 incidents. Figure 3.3, showing domestic violence simple assaults per 1000 
residents by county paints a similar picture. 
 
Fatal Encounters Data 
For my second dataset, I utilize a publicly sourced database of officer-involved fatalities 
from fatalencounters.org. This data is crowdsourced using news articles to generate a list of officer-
involved interactions that resulted in the death of a civilian.44 Additionally, this dataset is not 
limited to officer involved shootings, but rather any type of incident between an officer and civilian 
that resulted in a fatality.  
The exact location, date, and cause of death is provided for all 513 reported incidents in 
TN across a nineteen-year period (2000-2019). Causes of death fall into five major categories: 1) 
Beaten/Bludgeoned with instrument, 2) Burned/Smoke inhalation, 3) Chemical agent/Pepper 
 
44 If an OIF occurred and was never reported by the Media, it would not appear in this dataset. 
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spray, 4) Gunshot, and 5) Vehicle.45 In my analysis I examine the impact of all causes of death as 
well as a separate analysis for Gunshot deaths only. Descriptive statistics for the fatal encounters 
data can be found in Table 3.2.  
There is an average of 3.3 officer-involved fatalities (OIFs) per county per year in TN. The 
victims of these encounters are mostly white (41%) or black (24%). However, in 33 percent of the 
incidents, the race of the victim is not identified. Over 90 percent of the victims are male with an 
average age of 28 years old. The most common cause of death is Gunshot at over 76 percent. The 
next most common cause of death is Vehicle at 17 percent. 
Figure 3.4 shows OIFs by county over this 20-year period (2000-2019). OIFs are most 
concentrated in the urban counties: Shelby, Davidson, Knox, and Hamilton county. Shelby county 
has the most officer-involved fatalities with 115 incidents between 2000-2019. There are also 
multiple counties, mostly rural, without a single reported OIF during this period. 
 
911-Calls for Service Data 
Finally, my third dataset includes 911-calls for service from the second largest city in 
Tennessee: Memphis.46 For each call, I am able to identify the time, address, and reason for the 
call (domestic violence, traffic accident, etc.). Descriptive statistics for city-level data can be found 
in Table 3.3. This data is aggregated to the daily level and more location specific, offering a 
different measurement of domestic violence incidence. Therefore, if the effects of officer-involved 
fatalities are more localized within a county, I will be able to better observe changes in reporting 
behavior. 
 
45 There are more minor categories for cause of death with very few observations including: 
Asphyxiated/Restrained, Drowned, Fell from a height, Medical emergency, Tasered, and Undetermined. 
46 This data was acquired using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) per request for each individual city.  
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One important caveat to note in both of my domestic violence datasets is that I cannot 
identify who is reporting the incident. In both the incident reports and 911 calls, I only observe 
that a call was made, but not by who. It is very possible that a third-party observer could call the 
police if they witnessed an incident of domestic violence but were not personally the victim. 
However, according to the Department of Justice in their report on the Practical Implications of 
Current Domestic Violence Research, “most domestic violence reports are called in by victims, 
with victim report rates ranging from 59 to 93 percent” (Klein 2009). So, while third-party 
reporting most likely appears in my datasets, though unidentifiable, it likely constitutes a small 
portion of observed incidents. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
 I begin my analysis by looking at county-level reported incidents of domestic violence. 
This data is more expansive than the 911 call data, covering all 95 counties in TN for 18 years. 
Here I am interested in whether an OIF effects domestic violence reporting within the same county. 
Then, I move onto the 911 call data from the four largest cities in Tennessee. While this data is 
less expansive, it is more detailed in reported geographic location, allowing me to narrow my 
investigation geographically. For this analysis I aggregate 911 calls to the zip code-level, 
examining the effects of an officer-involved fatality on domestic violence 911 calls within that 
same zip code.  
I use the same identification strategies for both datasets. Starting with an event study 
framework, I use the following estimation strategy to determine the effects of an officer involved 
death/shooting on domestic violence reporting. Using indicator variables for the 7 days prior to an 
officer-involved civilian death and 7 days after, I am able to determine if there was a significant 
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change in domestic violence incidents. In the estimation equation, 𝑦𝑖𝑑 is the number of domestic 
violence incidents in county (zip code) 𝑖 on date 𝑑. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑂𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑗 is an indicator of whether county 
(zip code) 𝑖 experienced a fatal OIF on date 𝑗 (estimates effects within a 14-day window around 
shooting at 𝑗=𝑑). I also include county-level (zip code-level) control variables (𝐱𝑖𝑡), year fixed 
effects (𝜃𝑡), and county (zip code) fixed effects (𝑐𝑖). 
 
Event Study Estimation Strategy: 
𝑦𝑖𝑑 =  {∑ 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑂𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝛽𝑗
𝑑+7
𝑗=𝑑−7 } + x𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑑  (1) 
 
 I further expand the event window by aggregating the data to a weekly level of domestic 
violence incidents and using a 9-week event window (4 weeks before and 4 weeks after an officer-
involved fatality). This eliminates some noise from daily level variation in reports but also allows 
me to test if there are longer-term effects on reporting. 
 Next, I employ a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, analyzing the effects of an 
incident on within county (zip code) reporting in the 3-7 days that follow. In equation 2, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the 
number of domestic violence reports in county (zip code) 𝑖 at time 𝑡. I include an indicator variable, 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 for the four weeks after an incident and a treated county (zip code) indicator, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖, for 
counties (zip codes) where the incident took place. My coefficient of interest is 𝛽3, the interaction 
of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑂𝐼𝐹𝑡. Similar to the event study, I include county-level (zip code-level) 
controls, county (zip code) fixed effects, and year/month fixed effects. 
 
Difference-in-Difference Estimation Strategy: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑂𝐼𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑂𝐼𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (2) 
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 Similar to the event study analysis, I also expand the difference-in-difference treatment 
window to the 4 weeks before and after an OIF, aggregating data to a weekly level. This allows 
me to test whether effects observed in the 3-7-day windows persist in the weeks after an incident. 
  
Results 
TN County-level Event Study 
I begin the analysis by looking at the effects of an OIF on domestic violence reporting at 
the county level. Using variation between counties, I calculate an event window (14 days) in which 
an OIF occurs within a county using counties that do not have an OIF occurrence within the same 
timeframe as the control group. Creating daily indicator variables, I use an event study framework 
and regress the daily number of simple assaults and all assaults on them. Both dependent variables 
are population-based counts of reported domestic incidents per 1000 residents. I incorporate 
county controls for unemployment, population, and weather.47 I also include day of the week, 
month, and county by year fixed effects.48 
Figure 3.5 graphs the point estimates for daily reports of domestic violence simple assaults 
during the 14-day window using the 7th day before an officer-involved incident as the control. 
Figure 3.6 shows the same estimation using All Assaults as the dependent variable. Both figures 
show similar point estimates, indicating a response not statically different from zero.49 
 
47 Employment and population data are from the American Community Survey released by Census Bureau. Weather 
data is compiled by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
48 It is important to include day of week fixed effects as domestic violence incidents fluctuate heavily throughout the 
week with more incidents falling on Saturday and Sunday. 
49 If I limit the event window to 3 days before to 3 days after and OIF, I observe no nonzero responses in domestic 
violence reports (Appendix, Figures 3.A.1 and 3.A.1) 
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 To eliminate potential noise in the variation of daily level data, I aggregate calls to a weekly 
level. This reduces some of the daily variation in reports and offers a better picture of domestic 
violence reporting’s responsiveness to police violence. Using the same event study estimation, I 
regress weekly indicators on reported domestic violence incidents using a nine-week time window 
(4 weeks before, the week of, and 4 weeks after an officer-involved fatality). Figures 3.7 and 3.8 
show the point estimate using weekly measures of reported simple assaults and all assaults per 
1000 residents, respectively. 
  Even with the weekly measurements, I still observe responses not statistically different 
from zero. From the figures, I observe no significant changes in reports for either Simple Assaults 
or All Assaults in the weeks after an officer-involved incident. However, I do observe very large 
confidence intervals the week of an incident, so perhaps the effect is more centralized in the week 
of the officer-involved fatality. 
 
TN County-level Difference-in-Difference 
I next turn to a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. Here I look at the effect of an 
officer involved fatality on reported incidents of domestic violence within the same county. I limit 
the treatment time to 10 days, 7 days, and 3 days after an incident takes place. Additionally, I 
divide the state into three regions: east, middle, and west. Counties in a region outside of the 
effected county that do not also have an officer involved fatality in the same time period are used 
as control counties.50 This allows me to isolate the effect of an incident within a treated county. 
 
50 One might expect and officer involved fatality could have an effect on incidents in neighboring counties. Thus, by 
limiting the control counties to those outside the treated counties region, I reduce the likelihood of control counties 
being semi treated. 
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Table 3.4 shows the regression results for six different models, three with Simple Assaults 
per 1000 residents as the dependent variable and three models with All Assaults per 1000 residents 
as the dependent variable. All regression models include controls for weather (maximum 
temperature, minimum temperature, average temperature, and precipitation) and county-level 
socioeconomic status (percent unemployment). 51 I also include day of week, month, and county 
by year fixed effects in all models. 
Post OIF x Treated County is the interaction of the time period after an officer involved 
fatality and the treated county in which the incident took place. Since I include indicators for 
whether the victim is white and whether the cause of death was listed as “Gunshot,” the coefficient 
on this interaction can be interpreted as the average change in reported domestic simple assault 
when the victim of the OIF was nonwhite and the cause of death was not listed as “Gunshot.” The 
coefficient on Post OIF indicates the changes in domestic violence incidents across all counties in 
the days after an OIF. The coefficient on Treated County shows changes in domestic violence 
incidents in the treated county in the 10, 7, or 3 days prior to an OIF taking place. Looking at 
Simple Assaults first, there are no significant changes in simple assaults in the 10 or 7 days after 
an OIF occurred in the county where the OIF took place. However, there a small, significant 
increase in the 3 days after and OIF. Additionally, on the right half of the table, where All Assaults 
is the dependent variable, there is a significant increase in All Assaults per 1000 residents in the 7 
and 3 days after an OIF in the treated county. Since the mean of All Assaults per 1000 residents is 
0.0143, an increase of 0.0013 represents a 22 percent increase in domestic violence reports in 
treated counties after an OIF. This effect is unchanged if the race of the OIF victim was reported 
as white/Caucasian or cause of death listed as “Gunshot.”  
 
51 Weather data is from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, https://www.noaa.gov/. 
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In Table 3.4A, I limit the analysis to gunshot fatalities only. Here, I observe an increase in 
reports across all counties in the 3-7 days following an OIF. Additionally, the coefficient on Post 
OIF x Treated County is positive and significant in the 10 days after an OIF in the treated county. 
However, if the victim is white, reports decreased relative to OIF’s where the victim was nonwhite. 
similar patterns across all variables of interest, but slightly lower magnitudes. Additionally, the 
level of unemployment has a positive significant effect on domestic violence reports in the 3 days 
after an OIF for All Assaults. This is consistent with previous work showing unemployment and 
domestic violence are positively correlated (Lindo et al. 2018). 
As shown in Figure 3.4, OIF incidents are highly concentrated in Shelby, Davidson, Knox, 
and Hamilton counties. These counties experience multiple OIFs per year, which might create 
desensitization toward police violence. Thus, dropping these four counties from the analysis, might 
allow me to pick up on any effects in less-treated counties. Table 3.5 shows the same regression 
as Table 3.4, excluding data from the four most populated counties in Tennessee. Here, the 
coefficient on Treated County is negative and significant for the 3-7 days after an OIF when Simple 
Assaults is the outcome variable of interest and 3 days after and OIF when All Assaults is the 
outcome variable of interest. This indicates that counties where an OIF occurs experience 
significantly lower reports of domestic violence relative to untreated counties. Similar to Table 
3.4, the coefficient of Post OIF x Treated County is positive and significant for both models using 
a 3-day time window. However, if the cause of death is listed as “Gunshot,” I observe a significant 
decrease in All Assault reports relative to other causes of death listed in the 7-10 days after an OIF 
in the treated county. 
 
88 
Zip code-level Event Study 
 Using 911 call data affords me an alternate form of measurement for a typically 
underreported crime. 911 calls represent calls for help, which might be more frequent than reports 
filed. Further the 911 call data reports the address from which the call took place, allowing me to 
study potentially more localized effects of police violence on crime reporting. In this analysis, I 
use 911 call data from Memphis, TN. 
I begin the analysis by studying the effect of an OIF on 911 calls across the city of 
Memphis. Memphis is an ideal city to begin analyzing zip code level data. First, Memphis has the 
longest panel set of 911 call data available. Second, Memphis has the highest number of OIFs (41) 
and largest population in the state.52 Figure 3.9 shows the population density of each Memphis zip 
code in persons per square mile. While the downtown area is the most densely populated, the 
majority of 911 calls come from South and North Memphis rather than downtown. (Figure 3.10). 
Similarly, 911 calls for domestic situations are mostly from South and North Memphis (Figure 
3.11). 
Given this disparity in calls, I take a closer look at zip code level socioeconomic data. 
Figure 3.12 shows the percent of residents living below the poverty line by zip code. Within 
Memphis, this percentage varies significantly, ranging from 2-64 percent. Similarly, Figure 3.13 
shows the unemployment rate by zip code. High rates of unemployment and poverty are usually 
associated with higher crime (Kelly 2000). So, it is perhaps, unsurprising, that 911 calls are more 
frequent in zip codes with higher poverty rates and unemployment. 
Figure 3.14 shows officer-involved fatalities by zip code. While multiple zip codes never 
experience an OIF, one zip code has as many as 12 during this 9-year period. Similar to the 911 
 
52 This number of OIF’s is smaller than the 115 listed earlier in Shelby county due to the difference 911 data 
available (20 years for county-level data, 9-years for 911 data). 
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calls, OIFs are more frequent in North and South Memphis zip codes, with fewer OIFs in the 
downtown area. However, visually, the zip codes with the most OIFs are not necessarily the zip 
codes with the highest poverty rates or 911 calls. 
One thing to note is the racial segregation in Memphis geography. Memphis is majority 
black or African American (64.2%) in sharp contrast with the rest of Tennessee which is 
majority white (78.5%).53  Within the city, the racial make-up of zip codes varies significantly. 
Figure 3.15 shows the percentage of residents who identify as Non-Hispanic/White. The 
percentage of white residents ranges from 2.4 to 90.2 percent. Comparing Figures 3.14 and 3.15, 
there is a noticeable similarity between majority non-white zip codes and zip codes with multiple 
OIFs. 
Given this picture of Memphis, it is very likely that OIFs are more common in areas that 
are majority non-white, with high unemployment rates and more frequent 911 calls for service. 
Thus, in my analysis I use fixed effect to control for zip code level heterogeneity. 
I use the same event study framework from the county-level analysis. Using a 14-day 
estimation window, I generate indicator variables for the 7 days before and 7 days after an OIF. I 
then regress daily 911 calls for domestic violence on those indicator variables. Figure 3.16 shows 
the coefficient estimates for the daily indicator variables. In the days after an officer-involved 
fatality, there is a slight, statistically significant increase in 911 calls for domestic violence on the 
5th and 6th day afterwards. However, this estimation is rather noisy. 
As a robustness check, I perform the same regression using the number of total daily 911 
calls as the dependent variable. Figure 3.17 shows the coefficients for all daily indicator variables 
 
53 U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Memphis, TN (2019) https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/memphiscitytennessee 
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in the 7 days before and after an incident. Here again, there is a lot of noise in the daily estimation, 
but there is a positive significant increase in daily 911 calls 6 and 7 days after an OIF.   
Due to noisiness in the daily measurements, I next turn to a week-level analysis. 
Aggregating the data to a weekly level eliminates a lot of variation and noise in the daily data. 
With the week-level analysis, I extend the treatment window to four weeks before and four weeks 
after an officer-involved fatality. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show the coefficient estimates for weekly 
indicators before and after an incident. In Figure 3.18, there is a significant increase in 911 
domestic violence calls one week after an OIF within that zip code. However, the weekly estimates 
are still quite noisy both before and after the OIF. 
Figure 3.19 shows a significant decrease in 911 calls per 1000 residents in the 4th week 
after a shooting. However, a deeper examination of the data reveals multiple overlapping incidents 
in the 8-week time window, even within the same zip code. Thus, and event study might not be 
the best estimation strategy for this pattern of incidence. I next turn to a difference-in-difference 
estimation strategy. 
 
Zip code-level Difference-in-difference 
I begin by using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy similar to that in the county-
level analysis. I start with a short time window, where Post OIF is equal to 1 in the 3 or 7 days 
after an officer-involved fatality. Table 3.6 shows the results of five regression models on domestic 
violence 911 calls in the 7 days after a shooting. Here, the difference-in-difference coefficient of 
interest is Post OIF x Treated Zip code. Because I include interactions based on whether the police 
victim was white, male, or the cause of death listed as “Gunshot,” the coefficient on Post OIF x 
Treated Zip code can be interpreted as the average effect of an OIF involving a nonwhite female 
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where the cause of death was not “Gunshot” on domestic violence 911 calls within the treated zip 
code. There is no significant effect of an OIF on domestic violence 911 calls in the same zip code 
for any of the five models. However, the coefficient on Treat Zip code is negative and significant 
for models 3. This indicates that zip codes in which OIFs occur experience fewer 911 calls for 
domestic abuse. This effect drops out when I include zip code and zip code by year fixed effects.  
Coefficients on Percent Unemployed and Percent Below Poverty are positive and 
significant, indicating zip codes where poverty and unemployment are higher experience more 911 
calls for domestic abuse. These effects drop out when including zip code fixed effects. 
Narrowing the event window to 3 days before and after an OIF, Table 3.6A shows the 
results of five regression models on domestic violence 911 calls in the 3 days after a shooting. The 
coefficient on Treated Zip code is negative and significant for all models, indicating zip codes 
where OIFs occur experience fewer 911 calls for domestic abuse. The coefficient on Post OIF x 
Treated Zip code is positive and significant, meaning 911 calls for domestic violence increased in 
the 3 days after an OIF. 54 Additionally, models 1-3 indicate that if the victim was male, 911 calls 
were significantly lower relative to OIFs where the victim was female. This effect does not persist 
in models 4 and 5 where fixed effects for zip code and zip code by year are included. 
 As a robustness check, I use the same estimation strategy but with total 911 calls as the 
dependent variable. Tables 3.7 and 3.7A show these regression results for 7-day and 3-day 
treatment windows, respectively. Again, my coefficient of interest is Post OIF x Treated Zip 
code. In Table 3.7, there is no significant change in 911 calls within the zip code where and OIF 
took place in the 7 days after the incident. However, the coefficient on Race of Police Victim: 
White is negative and significant in model 2. Thus, 911 calls in the treated county in the 7 days 
 
54 The mean of daily 911 domestic violence calls per 1000 residents is 0.341. 
92 
after an OIF where the victim was white are 9 percent lower than OIFs where the victim was 
nonwhite.55 Additionally, models 1-3 show a large, negative significant coefficient on Treated 
Zip code, similar to Tables 3.6 and 3.6A. Finally, the coefficients on Percent Below Poverty are 
positive and significant, indicating zip codes with higher rates of poverty experience 
significantly more 911 calls. 
Table 3.7A shows the effect of and OIF on 911 calls for service during a 3-day post-
fatality window. The coefficient on Post OIF x Treated Zip code is negative and significant for 
models 2-5, indicating zip codes that experience an OIF saw a decrease in 911 calls in the 3 days 
afterward. The coefficient in model 5, -0.7441 indicates a 16 percent decrease in 911 calls. 
However, the coefficient on Gender of Police Victim: Male is positive and significant. Thus, 
treated counties in which the victim of the OIF is male experiences a smaller decrease in 911 
calls that those where the victim is female (911 calls decrease only 5 percent). Additionally, the 
coefficient on Treated Zip code is positive and significant, indicating zip codes that experience 
an OIF also experience more 911 calls. 
Similar to the county-level analysis, I aggregate the data to the week level to reduce the 
noisiness of daily measure. Using an 8-week and 4-week time window, I use a difference-in-
difference estimation strategy to study the effects of an OIF on domestic violence 911 calls in the 
2-4 weeks after an incident. For the 8-week window, I generate a treatment variable equal to 1 
during the four weeks after an OIS. Similarly, I generate a dummy variable for calls made in the 
same zip code as an OIS incident. Again, these calls are translated into calls per 1000 residents in 
a zip code.  
 
55 The mean of daily 911 calls per 1000 residents is 4.615. 
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Results for the 8-week window are presented in Table 3.8. The coefficient on Post OIF x 
Treated Zip code is negative and significant for models 1-3, indicating zip codes that experience 
an OIF saw a decrease in domestic violence 911 calls in the 4 weeks after an incident. However, 
the coefficient on Post OIF is negative and significant for all models, indicating 911 calls for 
domestic violence decreased in the 4 weeks after an OIF for all zip codes. 
When I shorten the event window to 4 weeks in Table 3.8A, looking at the two weeks 
before and two weeks after an OIF, I find similar results. The coefficient on Post OIF x Treated 
Zip code is again negative and significant for models 1-3. However, now the coefficient on Treated 
Zip code is positive and significant, indicating zip codes where OIFs occur experience more 911 
calls for domestic violence than those that do not experience an OIF. Additionally, the coefficients 
for Gender of Police Victim: Male and Cause of Death: Gunshot are positive and significant, 
meaning OIFs where the victim was male or the cause of death listed as “Gunshot” experienced 
relatively more 911 calls for domestic violence in the 2 weeks after an incident relative to OIFs 
where the victim was female and cause of death not listed as “Gunshot.” 
 To determine whether an OIF affected crime reporting across all types of crime, I utilize 
the same analysis for a week-level estimation but with total 911 calls as the dependent variable. I 
again use event windows of 8 and 4 weeks. These results are displayed in Tables 3.9 and 3.9A 
respectively. In Table 3.9, 911 calls decreased in the 4 weeks after an officer-involved fatality by 
approximately 22 percent (models 3 and 4) across all zip codes.56  The coefficient on Post OIF x 
Treated Zip code is negative and significant for models 1 and 2. However, this effect drops out 
when zip code and zip code by year fixed effects are incorporated. In model 5, Race of Police 
 
56 The mean of weekly 911 calls by zip code is 3.808 calls per 1000 residents. 
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Victim: White is negative and significant, indicating if the OIF victim was white, 911 calls in 
treated counties decreased more relative to OIFs where the victim was nonwhite. 
 However, when I shorten the window to two weeks before and after an OIF, I find that 
OIFs have a negative significant effect on 911 calls in treated zip codes. The coefficient in models 
1-4 on Post OIF x Treated Zip code indicates treated zip codes with OIFs where the victims is a 
nonwhite female where cause of death was not listed as “Gunshot,” experienced a 25 percent 
decrease in 911 calls during the 2 weeks after an OIF. However, in models 3 and 4, if the victim 
was white, treated counties experienced a smaller decrease in 911 calls of only 6 percent.  
 
Neighborhood-level Difference-in-difference 
 Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show that the effects of an OIF in one zip code may have widespread 
effects outside that particular zip code, meaning neighboring zip codes may be impacted as well. 
To broaden this analysis and potential capture more wide-spread effects, I extend my analysis to 
include neighborhood effects. Grouping zip codes into “neighborhoods” as defined by the 
Memphis Chamber, I create neighborhood level indicators for treatment and control groups.57 
Using newly defined treatment and control groups, I estimate the effects of an OIF occurring in a 
particular neighborhood on domestic violence and total 911 calls. Tables 3.10-3.11 display these 
estimations examining neighborhood-level effects. 
 The coefficient on Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood is negative and significant in all 
models, indicating OIFs where the victim is a nonwhite female where the cause of death is not 
listed as “Gunshot” decreases 911 calls for domestic violence by 14 percent. Additionally, 
neighborhoods that are treated with OIFs experience significantly higher volumes of 911 calls for 
 
57 Neighborhoods include both single and multiple zip codes as defined by the Memphis Chamber 
https://memphischamber.com/welcome-to-memphis/live-memphis/memphis-neighborhoods/ 
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domestic violence. Finally, the coefficient on Post OIF is negative and significant for all models, 
indicating there is still a city-wide effect across all zip codes of an OIF. Domestic violence 911 
calls decrease by 6 percent in the four weeks after an OIF.  
Table 3.10A limits the time window to 4 weeks, two before and two after an OIF. Results 
are similar to that of Table 3.10. Additionally, the coefficient on Gender of Police Victim: Male is 
positive and significant. Thus, neighborhoods with male victim OIFs saw less of a decrease in 
domestic violence calls relative to female victims.58  
Similar to Table 3.9, Table 3.11 shows estimations of the effect of an OIF on total 911 calls 
with an 8-week time window. The coefficient on Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood is negative 
and significant for all models, demonstrating a decrease in 911 calls in treated neighborhoods after 
an OIF incident. This effect holds when limiting the time window to 4 weeks in Table 3.11A. 
 
Discussion 
This paper is the first to investigate the impact of officer-involved fatalities (OIFs) on domestic 
violence reporting. Additionally, this is the first analysis of repeated OIFs at the county and zip 
code level with panel data across as many as 20 years. I find little to no effect of OIFs on domestic 
violence reporting at the county level. However, using zip code-level 911 call data from Memphis, 
TN, I find some evidence of decreased 911 for domestic violence across all zip codes in the weeks 
after an OIF.  
When I divide zip codes into neighborhoods, I find that an OIF has a significant negative effect 
on domestic violence calls within the treated neighborhoods. Additionally, I still observe an overall 
decrease in domestic violence calls across all neighborhoods in the weeks after an OIF. While the 
 
58 In some models, like model 4, male victims have a positive significant effect on 911 calls for domestic violence. 
96 
effects of an OIF may be more widespread than neighborhood or zip code, 911 calls for domestic 
violence decrease even further in treated neighborhoods. Additionally, I find that neighborhoods 
treated by an OIF have higher volumes of 911 calls for domestic violence and total 911 calls. 
I also find that total 911 calls decrease significantly in the days/weeks after an OIF in treated 
zip codes. This effect continues when I extend the analysis to neighborhoods. Thus, the level of 
overall crime reporting decreases in treated neighborhoods/zip codes after an OIF. 
These results demonstrate that officer interactions with citizens could affect an individual’s 
proclivity to report crimes. Further analysis will include additional data from the other 3 largest 
cities in Tennessee. Including these might offer more insight into potential long run effects.  
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In Chapter 1, I use a laboratory experiment to compare three popular point-of-sale 
solicitation methods: a fixed donation request (yes or no to a randomly assigned amount); a 
rounding request (yes or no to an endogenous amount); and an open-ended solicitation. I find 
that, at amounts less than $1, participants in the rounding treatments were much more likely to 
donate. Holding fixed the amount of the ask, differences in donation rates between the rounding 
and fixed request treatments appear to be driven by “loose-change effects,” whereby individuals 
are more likely to donate if they would have less change as a result. Participants in the fixed 
request treatments exhibited higher mean willingness-to-donate than those in the open-ended. 
Last, a one sentence information statement about the charity has positive but small effects on 
donation rates and amounts in the fixed request treatment. 
In Chapter 2, I study key aspects of fundraising campaigns that utilize goals or provision 
points that must be met in order to provide a good or service. I find that the addition of an 
intermediate goal decreases the likelihood of reaching the final goal. Moreover, the level of the 
intermediate goal (holding payoffs for reaching the goal fixed) has no discernible effect on 
whether the intermediate or final goal is reached. This suggests a possible strategy whereby the 
campaign designer includes a final goal as a decoy in order to reach the desired “intermediate” 
goal. Value uncertainty has a negative significant effect on the likelihood of reaching the goal 
when only one goal is present. Finally, goal uncertainty has a positive significant effect on 
contributions. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the effects of officer-involved fatalities, including officer-involved 
shootings, on domestic violence reporting. I find little to no effect of OIFs on domestic violence 
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reporting at the county level. However, using zip code-level 911 call data from Memphis, TN, I 
find some evidence of decreased 911 calls for domestic violence in neighborhoods where an 
officer-involved fatality took place. Further, I find that total 911 calls also decrease in affected zip 
codes and neighborhoods. The magnitude of the effects is dependent on the race of the OIF victim 






Appendix A.  
 
Chapter 1 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1 Mechanisms by Treatment 
 Fixed Request Rounding Open-ended 
No Information T1 T2 T3 






Table 1.2 Data Description 
Variable name Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
    
Male =1 if identified gender is male 0.574 0.495 
Age age, in years 20.478 2.244 
Earnings earnings from experiment session, in $ 22.496 5.009 
Recently Donated =1 if participant recently donated to charity 0.658 0.475 
Gave =1 if participant donated 0.491 0.500 
Donation Amount monetary amount donated to charity 0.418 0.748 
Fixed Request =1 if donation ask was a fixed request 0.346 0.476 
Fixed Request Info 
=1 if donation ask was a fixed request with 
information 
0.310 0.463 
Rounding =1 if donation ask was rounding 0.099 0.299 
Rounding Info =1 if donation ask was rounding with information 0.102 0.302 
Open-ended =1 if donation ask was open-ended 0.074 0.261 
Open-ended Info =1 if donation ask was open-ended with information 0.069 0.254 
50 cent =1 if donation ask was 50¢ 0.190 0.392 
75 cent =1 if donation ask was 75¢ 0.171 0.377 
Information 
=1 if donation ask contained information about the 
charity 
0.481 0.500 




Table 1.3 Treatment Statistics 
Treatment Fixed Request Rounding Open-ended 
Information No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 310 278 89 91 66 62 
N Gave 115 126 73 72 25 29 
Mean Give Rate 37.09% 45.32% 82.02% 79.12% 37.88% 46.77% 
Mean Donation $0.29 $0.38 $0.41 $0.39 $0.83 $0.81 








Table 1.4 Analysis of donation rates 





   
Fixed Request -0.008 0.010 
 (0.066) (0.067) 
Fixed Request with Info 0.074 0.092 
 (0.067) (0.068) 
Rounding 0.441*** 0.417*** 
 (0.073) (0.074) 
Rounding with Info 0.412*** 0.396*** 
 (0.074) (0.075) 
Open-ended with Info 0.089 0.075 
 (0.087) (0.087) 
Earnings  0.017*** 
  (0.003) 
Age  0.010 
  (0.006) 
Gender  0.015 
  (0.032) 
Recently Donated  -0.104*** 
  (0.022) 
Constant 0.379*** -0.092 
 (0.060) (0.168) 
   
Observations 896 891 
R-squared 0.105 0.136 
F-statistic 26.96 21.42 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Estimates for 





Table 1.5 Mechanism Comparison at Amounts under $1 
Depended Variable: Gave Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Fixed Request     0.196*** 
(0.053) 
0.198***  
(0.054)       
0.220*** 













50cent  0.010 
(0.047)       
0.007 
(0.047) 
75cent  -0.144*** 
(0.048)       
-0.131***  
(0.048)    
Earnings   0.016*** 
(0.004)       
Age    -0.000 
(0.008) 
Gender    0.007 
(0.040) 
Recently Donated    -0.072***  




(0.054)       
0.115 
(0.196)    
N 574 574 572 
R2 0.096 0.114 0.134 
F-Statistic 23.69 16.66 13.71 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Estimates for all 
models use robust standard errors.   
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Table 1.6 Loose-change Effects by Mechanism 
Potential change leftover post donation 
relative to current change 
Donation Rate 
Fixed Request Rounding 
Less 81.51% 79.47% 
More 38.78% -- 
Fixed Request Less = Fixed Request More p = 0.000 
Fixed Request Less = Rounding p = 0.555 








Table 1.7 Analysis of Donation Amount by Treatment 





   
Fixed Request -0.536*** -0.515** 
 (0.204) (0.203) 
Fixed Request with Info -0.449** -0.428** 
 (0.205) (0.204) 
Rounding -0.419** -0.437** 
 (0.204) (0.203) 
Rounding with Info -0.437** -0.446** 
 (0.204) (0.204) 
Open-ended with Info -0.015 -0.031 
 (0.263) (0.261) 
Earnings  0.020*** 
  (0.005) 
Age  0.008 
  (0.008) 
Gender  -0.023 
  (0.050) 
Recently Donated  -0.078** 
  (0.030) 
Constant 0.830*** 0.347 
 (0.202) (0.297) 
   
Observations 896 891 
R-squared 0.052 0.067 
F-statistic 4.457 4.507 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Estimates for 




Table 1.8 Estimation of Willingness-to-Donate 
Dependent variable: Donation Amount Model 1 Model2 
   



























(0.131)   
Standard deviation function (σ):   








   
Observations 716 712 
Log pseudolikelihood  -693.435 -679.975 
Note: Observations for the Rounding treatment are not included in this regression. All sociodemographic variables 
are demeaned so that the intercept can be interpreted as the estimated mean WTP for the Fixed Request treatment in 
all models. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Estimates 
for both models use robust standard errors.  
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Table 1.9 Tests of information effects 
  
Pooled Fixed Request Rounding Open-ended 
H0: Info donations = No Info 
donations 
 
$0.06 $0.09* $0.00 $0.02 
H0: Info donation rate = No Info 
donation rate 
 
7.46%** 8.23%** 0.19% 8.90% 





Table 1.10 Information Effects on Donation Amount 
 
Dependent variable: Donation Amount 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Information 0.054 -0.015 -0.031 
 (0.050) (0.263) (0.261) 
Fixed Request  -0.536*** -0.515** 
  (0.204) (0.203) 
Fixed Request*Information  0.102 0.118 
  (0.267) (0.265) 
Rounding  -0.419** -0.437** 
  (0.204) (0.203) 
Rounding*Information  -0.002 0.022 
  (0.266) (0.264) 
Earnings   0.020*** 
   (0.005) 
Age   0.008 
   (0.008) 
Gender   -0.023 
   (0.050) 
Recently Donated   -0.078** 
   (0.030) 
Constant 0.392*** 0.830*** 0.347 
 (0.036) (0.202) (0.297) 
    
Observations 896 896 891 
R-squared 0.001 0.052 0.067 
F-statistic  1.15 4.46 4.51 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Estimates for all 





Table 1.11 Information Effects on Donation Rate 
 
Dependent variable: Gave 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Information 0.069** 0.089 0.075 
 (0.033) (0.087) (0.087) 
Fixed Request  -0.008 0.010 
  (0.066) (0.067) 
Fixed Request*Information  -0.007 0.008 
  (0.096) (0.096) 
Rounding  0.441*** 0.417*** 
  (0.073) (0.074) 
Rounding*Information  -0.118 -0.095 
  (0.105) (0.105) 
Earnings   0.017*** 
   (0.003) 
Age   0.010 
   (0.006) 
Gender   0.015 
   (0.032) 
Recently Donated   -0.104*** 
   (0.022) 
Constant 0.458*** 0.379*** -0.092 
 (0.023) (0.060) (0.168) 
    
Observations 896 896 891 
R-squared 0.005 0.105 0.136 
F-statistic  1.15 4.46 4.51 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Estimates for all 




Table 1.12 Enjoyment 
  No Indifferent Yes Total 
Donation 2.6% 15.8% 30.8% 49.2% 
No Donation 10.9% 27.3% 12.6% 50.8% 





























































0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
I like the charity
Benefited from Charity
Better use of Money
Feeling Generous



















0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Did not like Charity
Not Benefited from Charity
Not Good Use of Money
Not Feeling Generous





Reasons for not Giving
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Appendix B.  
 
Chapter 2. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1 Experimental Design 
 
One Goal Two Goals  
Two Goals  
(Uncertain final goal) 
Certain values T1 T2 T3 




Table 2.2 Goals by Treatment and Scenario 
 
One Goal  Two Goals, Known Two Goals, 2nd Unknown 
 Final Intermediate Final Intermediate Final 
Scenario 1 8 2 8 4 8 or 16 
Scenario 2 8 4 8 4 8 or 16 
Scenario 3 8 4 10 6 8 or 16 
Scenario 4 10 4 12 6 8 or 16 
Scenario 5 10 4 14 4 10 or 14 
Scenario 6 10 4 16 4 10 or 14 
Scenario 7 12 6 8 6 10 or 14 
Scenario 8 12 6 10 6 10 or 14 
Scenario 9 12 6 12 4 12 or no goal 
Scenario 10 14 6 16 4 12 or no goal 
Scenario 11 14 6 14 6 12 or no goal 
Scenario 12 14 8 10 6 12 or no goal 
Scenario 13 16 8 12 4 16 or no goal 
Scenario 14 16 8 14 4 16 or no goal 
Scenario 15 16 8 16 6 16 or no goal 
Scenario 16    6 16 or no goal 
Note: in cases where the final goal is uncertain, the two outcomes have a 50% chance of being drawn. In a case 
when “no goal” is chosen, the fundraising campaign stops after the intermediate goal is reached. 
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Table 2.3 Data Description 
  
Variable name Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
    
Male =1 if identified gender is male 0.592 0.492 
Age age, in years 20.136 1.681 
Earnings Earnings from experiment session, in $ 23.728 2.093 
Funded1 =1 if intermediate goal is reached 0.652 0.466 
Funded2 =1 if final goal is reached 0.737 0.202 
GPA cumulative GPA; midpoint of selected range 3.335 0.460 
Employed =1 if participant has a part-time or full-time job 0.351 0.478 
Risk number of Lottery A (safe) choices selected in risk MPL 5.380 1.653 
Risk Averse =1 if number of Lottery A (safe) choices >5 in risk MPL 0.519 0.500 
One Goal =1 if treatment is one goal with known values 0.174 0.380 
One Goal, UV =1 if treatment is one goal with unknown values 0.163 0.370 
Two Goals, Known =1 if treatment is two goals with known values 0.163 0.370 
Two Goals, 2nd Unknown =1 if treatment is two goals with unknown values 0.163 0.370 
Two Goals, Known UV =1 if treatment is two goals, 2nd unknown with known values 0.163 0.370 
Two Goals, 2nd Unknown 
UV 
=1 if treatment is two goals, 2nd unknown with unknown 
values 
0.174 0.380 
No Goal 2 =1 if No Goal was selected treatment =T3 or T6 0.090 0.141 
No Goal Possible 
=1 if scenario used No Goal as an option and treatment =T3 or 
T6 
0.159 0.223 
Value Uncertainty =1 if the payout is uncertain 0.500 0.501 
Final Goal Number of tokens needed for provision at the final level 11.590 0.789 
Intermediate Goal Number of tokens needed for provision at the first level 3.458 2.479 
Total Group Contributions Number of tokens contributed by the group 10.742 1.286 
Individual Contributions Number of tokens contributed by the individual 2.690 0.914 
Order1 =1 if order of randomized order of rounds was order 1 0.224 0.401 
Order2 =1 if order of randomized order of rounds was order 2 0.245 0.413 
Order3 =1 if order of randomized order of rounds was order 3 0.255 0.418 
Order4 =1 if order of randomized order of rounds was order 4 0.214  0.395  
    
Note: All variables are presented at the individual level with the exception of total group 
contributions.  
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Table 2.4 Analysis of fundraising success: group contributions 







































Risk Averse  
-0.918** 
(0.403) 
Controls for order effects? No Yes 
N 1163 1163 
R
2
 0.022 0.025 
F-statistic 7.07*** 3.70*** 
Notes: standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Observations where the “no goal” option was drawn are not 





Table 2.5 Analysis of fundraising success: group contributions, by goal structure 


























No Goal Possible   
-1.258*** 
(0.451) 
N 465 450 355 
R2  0.930 0.303 0.291 
F-statistic 2114.75*** 47.25*** 39.42*** 
Notes: standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Observations where the “no goal” option was drawn are not 




Table 2.6 Analysis of fundraising success: final goal 







































Risk Averse  
-0.186*** 
(0.060) 
Controls for order effects? No Yes 
N 1163 1163 
R
2
 0.032 0.064 
F-statistic 5.97*** 3.53*** 
Notes: standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at 





Table 2.7 Analysis of fundraising success: final goal, by goal structure 


























No Goal Possible   
-0.129** 
(0.061) 
N 465 450 355 
R2  0.012 0.117 0.159 
F-statistic 4.15** 14.83*** 21.77*** 
Notes: standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Observations where NoGoal2=1 are excluded from the 








Table 2.8 Analysis of fundraising success: intermediate goal 
 





























Risk Averse  
-0.019 
(0.017) 
Controls for order effects? No Yes 
N 946 946 
R
2
 0.001 0.007 
F Statistic 0.99 1.25 
Notes: standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at 





Table 2.9 Analysis of fundraising success: intermediate goal, by goal structure 
Dependent variable: Intermediate Goal Funded 
Two Goals, 
Known 

















No Goal Possible  
0.000 
(.) 
N 450 248 
R2  0.006 -0.003 
F-statistic 2.04 0.35 
Notes: cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at the 





Table 2.10 Variance in individual contributions, by treatment 







































Risk Averse  
-0.579 
(0.533) 
Controls for order effects? No Yes 
N 1214 1214 
R
2
 0.027 0.036 
F Statistic 1.32 1.28 
Notes: standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at 




Table 2.11 Variance in individual contributions, by goal structure 
 

























No Goal Possible   
0.343 
(0.325) 
N 1860 1800 1196 
R2  0.011 0.055 0.042 
F-statistic 8.29*** 48.06*** 12.87*** 
Notes: standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate estimate is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Periods where NoGoal2=1 are dropped from this regression. 





Note: Observations where the “no goal” option was drawn are not directly comparable and are excluded from this 
figure. 














One Goal Two Goals, Known Two Goals, 2nd Unkown
Certain Values Uncertain Values
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Note: Observations where the “no goal” option was drawn are not directly comparable and are excluded from this 
figure. 














One Goal Two Goals, Known Two Goals, 2nd Unkown
Certain Values Uncertain Values
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Note: Observations where the “No Goal Possible” option was drawn are not directly comparable and are excluded 
from this figure. 





Note: Observations where the “No Goal Possible” option was drawn are not directly comparable and are excluded 
from this figure. 




Note: Observations where the “No Goal Possible” option was drawn are not directly comparable and are excluded 
from this figure. 





Note: Observations where the “No Goal Possible” option was drawn are not directly comparable and are excluded 
from this figure. 






Note: Observations where the “No Goal Possible” option was drawn are not directly comparable and are excluded 
from this figure. 











Chapter 2 Theory 
 
Two Goal Case 
 
The two-goal setting can be characterized as a two-stage game played sequentially. Here, I can 
assume that a player makes decisions in the first stage in isolation of the second stage. This results 
in two separate probability functions for reaching goals one and two: 
𝑃𝐼(𝑥1𝐼 , 𝑥2𝐼) =  {
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑥1𝐼 + 𝑥2𝐼 < 𝑡𝐼
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑥1𝐼 + 𝑥2𝐼 ≥ 𝑡𝐼
 
𝑃𝐹(𝑥1𝐹, 𝑥2𝐹) =  {
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑥2𝐹 + 𝑥2𝐹 < 𝑡𝐹
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑥2𝐹 + 𝑥2𝐹 ≥ 𝑡𝐹
 
Here, 𝑡𝐹 is the second goal, with an individual payout of 𝑣𝐹. Thus, I can formulate response 
functions for both the first stage and second stage:  
 
First stage 
1. {(𝑥1𝐼 , 𝑥2𝐼): 𝑥1𝐼 + 𝑥2𝐼 = 𝑡𝐼;  𝑥1𝐼 ≤ 𝑣𝐼;  𝑥2𝐼 ≤ 𝑣𝐼}; 
2. (0,0); 
3. {(𝑥1𝐼 , 𝑥2𝐼):  𝑥1𝐼 < 𝑡𝐼 − 𝑣𝐼;  𝑥2𝐼 < 𝑡𝐼 − 𝑣𝐼}. 
Second stage 
1. {(𝑥1𝐹, 𝑥2𝐹): 𝑥1𝐹 + 𝑥2𝐹 = 𝑡𝐹;  𝑥1𝐹 ≤ 𝑣𝐹;  𝑥2𝐹 ≤ 𝑣𝐹}; 
2. (0,0); 
3. {(𝑥1𝐹, 𝑥2𝐹):  𝑥1𝐹 < 𝑡𝐹 − 𝑣𝐹;  𝑥2𝐹 < 𝑡𝐹 − 𝑣𝐹}. 
 
For any case where the value of a good in a single-goal game equals 𝑣 = 𝑣𝐹 , the two-goal 
problem reduces to a one-goal game where 𝑡 = 𝑡𝐹. 
 
Two-goal case with value uncertainty 
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 Similar to the single goal case, there exist two possible values of the good at both 
thresholds: 𝑣1𝐼 and 𝑣2𝐼 for the first goal 𝑡𝐼, and 𝑣1𝐹 and 𝑣2𝐹 for the second goal 𝑡𝐹. Hence 
1
2
(𝑣1𝐼 + 𝑣2𝐼) = 𝑣𝐼 and 
1
2
(𝑣2𝐹 + 𝑣2𝐹) = 𝑣𝐹  in comparison with the two-goal case with known 
values. Therefore, player one solves the first stage, making a contribution decision 𝑥1𝐼 before 





∗ (𝑣) = {












∗ (𝑣) = {
0,            𝑖𝑓 𝐸[𝑣𝐼] < 𝑡𝐼 − 𝑥2𝐼 ,         




∗ (𝑣) = {












∗ (𝑣) = {
0,            𝑖𝑓 𝐸[𝑣𝐹] < 𝑡𝐹 − 𝑥2𝐹 ,         
𝑡𝐹 − 𝑥2𝐹 ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝐹 − 𝑥2𝐹 ≤ 𝐸[𝑣𝐹] ≤ 𝜔.
  
 
Similar to the case with known values, if 𝑡𝐹 = 𝑡 and 
1
2
(𝑣1𝐹 + 𝑣2𝐹) = 𝑣𝐹, then the two-stage 
game is equivalent to the one-stage game with uncertain values. 
 
 
Chapter 2. Experiment Instructions 
 
(Note: Instructions are unaltered, with the exception of changing the task labels to reflect those 
used in the manuscript) 
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You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. Please follow the 
instructions carefully. At any time, please feel free to raise your hand if you have a question. At 
the end of today’s session, you will be paid your earnings privately and in cash. 
 
You have been randomly assigned an ID number for this experiment. You will never be asked to 
reveal your identity to anyone. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions.  In 
order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices or otherwise communicate 
with any other participant. Importantly, please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur 
during the experiment. 
 
Today’s session consists of three parts: Experiment 1, Experiment 2 and a short questionnaire. In 
Experiment 1, you will make a series of lottery decisions. In Experiment 2, you will be randomly 
sorted into groups and have the opportunity to contribute money to fund a project. If a project goal 









Please click “Continue” and refer to your computer screen while we read the instructions.  
 
We would like you to make a decision for each of 10 scenarios. Each scenario involves a choice 
between playing a lottery that pays $4 or $0 according to specified chances (Option A) or receiving 
$2 for sure (Option B). 
 
You will notice that the only differences across scenarios are the chances of receiving the high or 
low prize for the lottery. At the end of the today’s session, ONE of the 10 scenarios will be selected 
at random and you will be paid according to your decision for this selected scenario ONLY. Each 
scenario has an equal chance of being selected. 
 
Please consider your choice for each scenario carefully. Since you do not know which scenario 
will be played out, it is in your best interest to treat each scenario as if it will be the one used to 
determine your earnings.  
 
Before making decisions, are there any questions? 
 









In this experiment, all money amounts are denominated in tokens, and will be exchanged at a 
rate of 10 tokens to 1 US dollar at the end of the experiment. 
 
There will be many decision rounds. You will not know the number of rounds until the 
experiment has ended. Each decision round is separate from the other rounds, in the sense that 
the decisions you make in one round will not affect the outcome or earnings of any other round.  
 
In this experiment, participants will be randomly placed into four-person groups. You will 
remain in the same group for the entire experiment. 
 
The decision setting 
 
In each round, you are given an endowment of 8 tokens. You have the opportunity to contribute 
some or all your tokens towards funding a project. Any tokens not contributed are yours to keep. 
 
If enough tokens are contributed from the group, everyone in the group receives a “payout”. The 
payout is the same for every group member, and does not depend on how many tokens a 
particular person contributed. 
 
If you contribute tokens towards a goal, but that goal is not reached, these tokens will be 




The project will have up to two funding goals: an intermediate goal (Goal 1), and a final goal 
(Goal 2). Reaching either goal results in a payout to all members of the group. The payout to the 
group is higher when the final goal, Goal 2, is reached. 
 
At the start of the round, Goal 2 is uncertain, and will only be revealed if Goal 1 is reached. If 
Goal 1 is reached, the computer will randomly select Goal 2 from two possible options. Each 
option will have an equal chance of being selected.  
 
Know that, in some decision rounds, one of the two possible options for Goal 2 is “No Goal 2”. 






The payout for reaching a funding goal is uncertain. At the end of the decision round, if a goal is 
reached, the computer will randomly select the payout from two possible amounts. Each amount 
will have an equal chance of being selected.  Along with these instructions we have provided you 
with an example of what the decision screen on your computer will look like. Please refer to this 
as we read through the instructions. 
 
In this example,  
• Goal 1 is 4 tokens. If 4 tokens are contributed from the group, this goal is reached, and 
each group member receives a payout of either 3 or 7 (each with a 50% chance).  
• Goal 2 is either 10 or 14 tokens (each with a 50% chance) and is revealed only if Goal 1 
is reached.  
• The payout associated with Goal 2 is either 8 or 12 (each with a 50% chance). If this 
funding goal is reached, each group member receives a payout of either of 8 or 12 tokens 
(each with a 50% chance). 
 
How to contribute tokens 
 
To contribute tokens, you enter the number of tokens you would like to contribute and click the 
SUBMIT button. Once you do so, you will see progress made towards the funding goal on the 
right side of the screen.  
 
After your first contribution, you have the opportunity to contribute additional tokens. To do so, 
you follow the same procedure: enter the amount you want to contribute and click the SUBMIT 
button. You do not have the opportunity to alter your original contribution or otherwise take back 
tokens you previously contributed. 
 
When necessary, the computer will limit the amount you can contribute to make sure you do not 
contribute more than what is needed to reach the next goal, and to make sure you do not 




There is a timer on the upper right corner of the screen. You will have 2 minutes to make your 
decisions. During those 2 minutes, you can contribute tokens to the project fund. After 2 












Calculating your earnings 
 
In each round, there are three possible outcomes: (1) no goal is reached, (2) only Goal 1 is 
reached, or (3) Goal 2 is reached. We will discuss your earnings in each case. 
 
No goal reached. If there are not enough contributions to reach Goal 1, there are no payouts to 
the group. Any contributions you made towards Goal 1 will be refunded to you. Your earnings 
are then equal to the 8 tokens you started with. 
 
Your earnings = Endowment (8 tokens) 
 
ONLY Goal 1 reached. Each group member receives the Goal 1 payout. All contributions you 
made towards Goal 1 will be subtracted to calculate your earnings. If you contributed any tokens 
after Goal 1 was reached, these are refunded to you. 
 
Your earnings = Endowment + Goal 1 payout – tokens YOU contributed 
 
Goal 2 reached. Every group member receives the Goal 2 payout. All contributions you made 
will be subtracted to calculate your earnings. 
 
Your earnings = Endowment + Goal 2 payout – tokens YOU contributed 
 
At the end of each decision round you will be shown a results screen that summarizes the 
outcomes from the round, along with a calculation of your earnings.    
 
Proceeding through the experiment 
 
At the start of each decision round, you will be informed of the project goals and payouts in 
effect. Know that the project goals and payouts may differ from one round to the next, so pay 
close attention to this information.  
 
We realize that we have just provided you with plenty of information to think about. Before we 
proceed to the paid decision rounds, we will go through a training round to better familiarize you 
with the procedures.  
 
Aside from decisions in this training round, you will be paid based on the outcome of each 
decision round. This means that it is very important to consider each decision prior to making it.  
 















Appendix C.  
Chapter 3 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1 Reported domestic violence incidents and county-level statistics 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev 
Simple Assault Reports – county by year 589,847 256.235 892.49 
Simple Assault Reports – county by day 589,847 1.399 4.380 
Percent white - victim 589,847 0.811 0.326 
Percent black - victim 589,847 0.176 0.3157 
Percent race unknown - victim 589,847 0.013 0.095 
All Assault Reports – county by year 589,847 375.581 1294.66 
All Assault Reports – county by day 589,847 2.049 6.279 
Percent white - victim 589,847 0.556 0.404 
Percent black - victim 589,847 0.113 0.244 
Percent race unknown - victim 589,847 0.331 0.377 
County-level Socioeconomic Controls    
Percent in Labor Force - county 589,847 0.439 0.044 
Percent Employed - county 589,847 0.406 0.044 
Percent Unemployed - county 589,847 0.033 0.012 
Weather Controls    
Temperature Minimum - Index 589,847 45.085 67.972 
Temperature Maximum - Index 589,847 112.679 97.603 
Temperature Average - Index 589,847 7.859 27.243 





Table 3.2 Reported Officer Involved Fatalities - TN 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev 
    
Incidents by County by Year 536 3.325 2.938 
Race of Victim    
European-American/white 536 0.407 0.492 
African American/black 536 0.239 0.427 
Hispanic/Latino  536 0.021 0.142 
Middle Eastern 536 0.002 0.043 
Asian/Pacific islander 536 0.004 0.061 
Race unspecified 536 0.328 0.470 
Gender - Male 536 0.903 0.296 
Victim Age 536 27.77 13.40 
Cause of Death    
Gunshot 536 0.761 0.427 
Vehicle 536 0.174 0.379 
Beaten/Bludgeoned 536 0.011 0.105 
Burned/Smoke Inhalation 536 0.002 0.043 
Chemical Agent/Pepper Spray 536 0.006 0.075 
    
Source: Fatalencounters.org, Tennessee Data, 2001-2019. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of 911 Calls for Service and Zip code Controls 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev 
    
911 Calls for Service 6,240,117 110.327 52.659 
911 Calls for Domestic Violence 6,240,117 8.289 5.592 
Zip code Controls    
Percent Unemployed 6,220,275 6.462 2.784 
Percent Female 6,220,275 53.702 3.684 
Mean Household Income 6,220,188 54913.02 24095.6 
Percent Below Poverty Line 6,220,188 29.045 11.367 
Weather Controls    
Temperature Minimum - Index 6,160,882 43.652 35.586 
Temperature Maximum - Index 6,160,882 89.717 37.182 
Temperature Average - Index 6,160,882 18.537 18.760 





Table 3.4 Impact of Officer Involved Fatalities on Domestic Violence Reports per 1,000 
Residents 




10 Days 7 Days 3 Days 
 
10 Days 7 Days 3 Days 
        
Post OIF 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004  0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Treated County -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0020  -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0025 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013)  (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0020) 
Post OIF x Treated County 0.0012 0.0023 0.0033*  0.0025 0.0032** 0.0039** 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0017)  (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
Post OIF x Treated County x 
Race of Police Victim: White -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003  0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0014 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012)  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0017) 
Post OIF x Treated County x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0030  -0.0020 -0.0029 -0.0030 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0020)  (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0022) 
Percent Unemployed 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0133*** 0.0132*** 0.0134***  0.0200*** 0.0201*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
        
Observations 470,326 493,689 536,362  470,326 493,689 536,362 
R-squared 0.0797 0.0801 0.0810  0.1095 0.1100 0.1110 
Weather Controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects        
Month YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
County x Year YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Day of Week YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Estimates for 





Table 3.4A Impact of Officer Involved Fatalities on Domestic Violence Reports Filed: Cause of 
Death - Gunshot 




10 Days 7 Days 3 Days 
 
10 Days 7 Days 3 Days 
        
Post OIF 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005**  0.0003 0.0004* 0.0008** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Treated County -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0004  -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0006 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0011)  (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Post OIF x Treated County 0.0013* 0.0011 0.0011  0.0015 0.0013 0.0016 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010)  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
Post OIF x Treated County x 
Race of Police Victim: White -0.0015* -0.0014 -0.0015  -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0025 
 (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0014)  (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0019) 
Percent Unemployed 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003  0.0002 0.0002 0.0004* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0129*** 0.0127*** 0.0117***  0.0195*** 0.0192*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
        
Observations 209,434 170,531 96,198  209,434 170,531 96,198 
R-squared 0.0801 0.0795 0.0813  0.1087 0.1085 0.1106 
Weather Controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects        
Month YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
County x Year YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Day of Week YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 





Table 3.5 Impact of Officer Involved Fatalities on Domestic Violence Reports Filed – Less 
Treated Counties 




10 Days 7 Days 3 Days 
 
10 Days 7 Days 3 Days 
        
Post OIF 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004  0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Treated County -0.0016 -0.0032** -0.0053**  -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0069** 
 (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0020)  (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0030) 
Post OIF x Treated County 0.0015 0.0039* 0.0053  0.0034 0.0049 0.0070* 
 (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0033)  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0035) 
Post OIF x Treated County x 
Race of Police Victim: White 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005  0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0032 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0028)  (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0037) 
Post OIF x Treated County x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot -0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0046  -0.0040* -0.0045* -0.0044 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0034)  (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0038) 
Percent Unemployed 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0128*** 0.0127*** 0.0129***  0.0195*** 0.0196*** 0.0197*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)  (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
        
Observations 450,701 473,079 513,927  450,701 473,079 513,927 
R-squared 0.0669 0.0673 0.0681  0.0931 0.0937 0.0945 
Weather Controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects        
Month YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
County x Year YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Day of Week YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 





Table 3.6 7-day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence Calls 
Dependent Variable: Domestic 
Violence 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Post OIF -0.0092 -0.0076 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Treated Zip code -0.0596 -0.0656 -0.0719* -0.0300 -0.0392 
 (0.0503) (0.0460) (0.0415) (0.0356) (0.0441) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code 0.0542 0.0565 0.0562 0.0598 0.0615 
 (0.0410) (0.0395) (0.0402) (0.0414) (0.0428) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Race of 
Police Victim: White -0.0168 -0.0166 -0.0159 -0.0087 -0.0078 
 (0.0390) (0.0404) (0.0393) (0.0384) (0.0378) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Gender 
of Police Victim: Male -0.0460 -0.0482 -0.0485 -0.0179 -0.0203 
 (0.0568) (0.0603) (0.0589) (0.0558) (0.0560) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Cause 
of Death: Gunshot -0.0310 -0.0293 -0.0283 -0.0652 -0.0629 
 (0.0575) (0.0628) (0.0583) (0.0518) (0.0515) 
Zip code-level Controls      
Percent Unemployed 0.0248*** 0.0248*** 0.0248*** - - 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)   
Percent Female 0.0041** 0.0042** 0.0042** - - 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)   
Mean Household Income -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 0.0075*** 0.0074*** 0.0074*** - - 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)   
Constant -0.1890 -0.1670 -0.2230* 0.3387*** 0.3387*** 
 (0.1306) (0.1304) (0.1256) (0.0175) (0.0175) 
      
Observations 1,012,631 1,012,631 1,012,631 1,012,631 1,012,631 
R-squared 0.5425 0.5490 0.5523 0.5895 0.5950 
Day of Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES  
Zip code    YES  
Zip code by Year FE     YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 





Table 3.6A 3-day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence Calls 
Dependent Variable: 
Domestic Violence 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Post OIF 0.0139 0.0153 0.0060 0.0056 0.0054 
 (0.0145) (0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114) 
Treated Zip code -0.2650*** -0.2648*** -0.2645*** -0.1950* -0.2325* 
 (0.0903) (0.0821) (0.0884) (0.1004) (0.1146) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code 0.2629** 0.2630** 0.2562** 0.2252* 0.2548* 
 (0.1115) (0.1057) (0.1116) (0.1224) (0.1318) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Race of Police Victim: White -0.0151 -0.0136 -0.0134 -0.0066 -0.0062 
 (0.0304) (0.0319) (0.0325) (0.0338) (0.0336) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male -0.2229* -0.2240** -0.2173* -0.1823 -0.2100 
 (0.1161) (0.1098) (0.1153) (0.1225) (0.1325) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot -0.0276 -0.0255 -0.0253 -0.0303 -0.0322 
 (0.0547) (0.0559) (0.0546) (0.0523) (0.0527) 
Zip code-level Controls      
Percent Unemployed 0.0265*** 0.0265*** 0.0265*** - - 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)   
Percent Female 0.0034* 0.0034* 0.0034* - - 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)   
Mean Household Income -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0071*** - - 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)   
Constant -0.1766 -0.1464 -0.1634 0.3600*** 0.3605*** 
 (0.1293) (0.1299) (0.1273) (0.0268) (0.0266) 
      
 508,568 508,568 508,568 508,564 508,564 
Observations 0.5424 0.5479 0.5502 0.5853 0.5927 
R-squared YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of Week FE  YES YES YES YES 
Month FE   YES YES  
Zip code    YES  
Zip code by Year FE     YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Table 3.7 7-Day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls 
Dependent Variable: 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Post OIF 0.0376 0.0577 -0.0685 -0.0771 -0.0801 
 (0.0757) (0.0850) (0.0871) (0.0880) (0.0888) 
Treated Zip code -1.4666*** -1.5237*** -1.5309*** -0.0872 -0.0940 
 (0.3894) (0.3646) (0.3730) (0.1118) (0.1303) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code -0.2429 -0.1892 -0.1846 -0.1181 -0.1052 
 (0.1747) (0.2167) (0.2266) (0.1687) (0.1659) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Race 
of Police Victim: White -0.4042 -0.4380* -0.4201 -0.2385 -0.2403 
 (0.2834) (0.2344) (0.2559) (0.2152) (0.2060) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 0.1392 0.0554 0.0561 0.0891 0.1653 
 (0.2390) (0.2727) (0.2582) (0.2068) (0.2272) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot 0.2712 0.3005 0.2820 0.1047 0.0089 
 (0.2021) (0.2081) (0.1974) (0.1906) (0.2219) 
Zip code-level Controls      
Percent Unemployed 0.0953 0.0951 0.0947 - - 
 (0.0966) (0.0966) (0.0966)   
Percent Female -0.0930 -0.0929 -0.0929 - - 
 (0.0828) (0.0827) (0.0827)   
Mean Household Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 0.1229*** 0.1227*** 0.1228*** - - 
 (0.0322) (0.0321) (0.0321)   
Constant 3.6084 3.6714 4.5886 4.3618*** 4.3679*** 
 (4.2941) (4.2952) (4.3136) (0.1720) (0.1720) 
      
Observations 1,012,631 1,012,631 1,012,631 1,012,631 1,012,631 
R-squared 0.5414 0.5523 0.5599 0.8232 0.8324 
Day of Week FE  YES YES YES YES 
Month FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES  
Zip code FE    YES  
Zip code by Year FE     YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Table 3.7A 3-Day Treatment Window Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls 
Dependent Variable: 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Post OIF 0.1865** 0.1114 -0.0024 0.0051 0.0018 
 (0.0881) (0.0880) (0.0776) (0.0785) (0.0792) 
Treated Zip code -0.6163 -0.6162 -0.6234 0.5547*** 0.5776*** 
 (0.7125) (0.5454) (0.5731) (0.0962) (0.1094) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code -1.0207 -1.0556* -1.0779* -0.7183*** -0.7441*** 
 (0.7248) (0.6036) (0.6325) (0.1990) (0.1595) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Race of 
Police Victim: White -0.6243** -0.6174** -0.6256** -0.3877 -0.3732 
 (0.2684) (0.2788) (0.3030) (0.2684) (0.2693) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Gender 
of Police Victim: Male 0.7623 0.7941 0.8738 0.4728** 0.5285** 
 (0.7040) (0.5872) (0.6240) (0.2174) (0.1949) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Cause 
of Death: Gunshot 0.3991** 0.4016** 0.3428* 0.3464* 0.3159 
 (0.1764) (0.1781) (0.2014) (0.1929) (0.1928) 
Zip code-level Controls      
Percent Unemployed 0.0976 0.0977 0.0973 - - 
 (0.0984) (0.0983) (0.0982)   
Percent Female -0.0919 -0.0920 -0.0919 - - 
 (0.0839) (0.0838) (0.0837)   
Mean Household Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 0.1233*** 0.1231*** 0.1232*** - - 
 (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321)   
Constant 3.1654 3.3180 4.6575 4.4739*** 4.4745*** 
 (4.3429) (4.3429) (4.3727) (0.1411) (0.1417) 
      
Observations 508,568 508,568 508,568 508,564 508,564 
R-squared 0.5452 0.5552 0.5654 0.8305 0.8408 
Day of Week FE  YES YES YES YES 
Month FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES  
Zip code FE    YES  
Zip code by Year FE     YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Table 3.8 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls 
Dependent Variable: Domestic 
Violence 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF -0.1769*** -0.1721*** -0.1584** -0.1569** 
 (0.0550) (0.0603) (0.0582) (0.0584) 
Treated Zip code 0.0737 0.0753 0.2746** 0.0018 
 (0.1654) (0.1702) (0.1081) (0.0850) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code -0.6220** -0.6252* -0.6219* -0.5751 
 (0.3021) (0.3096) (0.3368) (0.3504) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Race 
of Police Victim: White 0.0961 0.0909 0.2074 0.4161 
 (0.3095) (0.3019) (0.2409) (0.2947) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 0.1512 0.1459 0.3350 0.2939 
 (0.2971) (0.2977) (0.3079) (0.3206) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Cause 
of Death: Gunshot 0.5116 0.5167 0.2901 0.2576 
 (0.3261) (0.3207) (0.3026) (0.3146) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed 0.1028** 0.1030** - - 
 (0.0478) (0.0479)   
Percent Female 0.0285** 0.0283** - - 
 (0.0121) (0.0121)   
Mean Household Income -0.0000 -0.0000 - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 0.0705*** 0.0704*** - - 
 (0.0109) (0.0110)   
Constant -1.8052** -2.0215*** 1.6010*** 1.5947*** 
 (0.6922) (0.6810) (0.1310) (0.1276) 
     
Observations 1,944 1,944 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.8663 0.8688 0.9173 0.9239 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Zip code   YES  
Zip code by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Table 3.8A 2 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls 
Dependent Variable: Domestic 
Violence 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF -0.0268 -0.0263 -0.0255 -0.0253 
 (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0183) 
Treated Zip code 0.1059** 0.1057** 0.0610* -0.0196 
 (0.0486) (0.0483) (0.0317) (0.0318) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code -0.2920*** -0.2917*** -0.2161* -0.1997 
 (0.0877) (0.0845) (0.1248) (0.1372) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Race 
of Police Victim: White 0.1168 0.1171 0.1925 0.2183 
 (0.2203) (0.2214) (0.1963) (0.1943) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 0.2051** 0.2041** 0.1821* 0.1790 
 (0.0781) (0.0758) (0.0958) (0.1060) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Cause 
of Death: Gunshot 0.2126** 0.2115** 0.1185 0.1045 
 (0.0860) (0.0801) (0.0715) (0.0749) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed 0.0171* 0.0174* - - 
 (0.0095) (0.0096)   
Percent Female 0.0084** 0.0084** - - 
 (0.0038) (0.0038)   
Mean Household Income 0.0000* 0.0000* - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 0.0187*** 0.0187*** - - 
 (0.0026) (0.0026)   
Constant -0.5725*** -0.6534*** 0.3775*** 0.3775*** 
 (0.2060) (0.2015) (0.0295) (0.0290) 
     
Observations 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597 
R-squared 0.8291 0.8310 0.8770 0.8868 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Zip code   YES  
Zip code by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Table 3.9 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls 
Dependent Variable: 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF -1.0228** -1.1541*** -0.8742*** -0.8770*** 
 (0.4478) (0.4103) (0.3146) (0.3174) 
Treated Zip code -3.4038 -3.4303 0.5306 0.7431 
 (3.1427) (3.2556) (0.7252) (0.8193) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code -5.3144** -5.2823** -2.0724 -2.1430 
 (2.3670) (2.2818) (2.5091) (2.4310) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Race of Police Victim: White -9.2797 -9.2883 -2.2726 -2.3725* 
 (5.9242) (6.4756) (1.6288) (1.2653) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 4.2057* 4.1680* 1.8031 2.2189 
 (2.1443) (2.1584) (1.8098) (1.7637) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot 6.5662** 6.5463** 1.6478 1.6134 
 (3.1676) (3.1182) (2.0349) (1.8656) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed -0.6719 -0.6664 - - 
 (0.8186) (0.8193)   
Percent Female -0.5253 -0.5261 - - 
 (0.6348) (0.6350)   
Mean Household Income -0.0000 -0.0000 - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 1.0189*** 1.0205*** - - 
 (0.1914) (0.1918)   
Constant 30.0032 31.1348 22.4803*** 22.5234*** 
 (33.5460) (33.5512) (0.7154) (0.7206) 
     
Observations 1,944 1,944 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.7614 0.7635 0.9657 0.9697 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Zip code   YES  
Zip code by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Table 3.9A 2 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls 
Dependent Variable: 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF 0.1578 0.1540 0.1589 0.1513 
 (0.1446) (0.1480) (0.1199) (0.1209) 
Treated Zip code -0.3736 -0.3761 0.3125** 0.3017** 
 (0.6135) (0.5949) (0.1305) (0.1331) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code -1.5050*** -1.4940*** -1.0080** -0.9652** 
 (0.3893) (0.3438) (0.3814) (0.3955) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x Race 
of Police Victim: White -2.8655*** -2.8785*** -0.4103 -0.5332 
 (0.9050) (0.9135) (0.3947) (0.4266) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 1.3171*** 1.3235*** 0.6877* 0.7511* 
 (0.3710) (0.3706) (0.3696) (0.3788) 
Post OIF x Treated Zip code x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot 1.3463** 1.3207** 0.5553 0.4836 
 (0.5045) (0.5032) (0.3754) (0.3655) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed -0.1199 -0.1188 - - 
 (0.1351) (0.1350)   
Percent Female -0.1026 -0.1027 - - 
 (0.1191) (0.1194)   
Mean Household Income 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Percent Below Poverty 0.1850*** 0.1851*** - - 
 (0.0332) (0.0333)   
Constant 4.8600 5.0934 3.7104*** 3.7309*** 
 (6.1778) (6.1063) (0.2004) (0.2026) 
     
Observations 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597 
R-squared 0.7288 0.7318 0.9360 0.9407 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Zip code   YES  
Zip code by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 






Table 3.10 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls by Neighborhood 
Dependent Variable: Domestic 
Violence 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF -0.1439** -0.1269** -0.1499** -0.1516** 
 (0.0505) (0.0517) (0.0536) (0.0538) 
Treated Neighborhood 0.5457*** 0.5329*** 0.3403*** 0.1735*** 
 (0.1272) (0.1335) (0.0551) (0.0500) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood -0.4600*** -0.4801*** -0.3315*** -0.3353*** 
 (0.0887) (0.0746) (0.0954) (0.0864) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Race of Police Victim: White -0.2382 -0.2523 -0.1198 -0.1345 
 (0.3341) (0.3204) (0.2944) (0.2797) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 0.2995* 0.2888** 0.1930 0.2099 
 (0.1365) (0.1307) (0.1345) (0.1247) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot 0.3082** 0.3309** 0.0928 0.1275 
 (0.1192) (0.1116) (0.0711) (0.0811) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed 0.0928 0.0930 0.0236 0.0236 
 (0.0685) (0.0689) (0.1201) (0.1206) 
Percent Female 0.0301* 0.0300* 0.0770 0.0770 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0472) (0.0474) 
Mean Household Income -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Percent Below Poverty 0.0678*** 0.0678*** 0.0557* 0.0557* 
 (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0254) (0.0255) 
Constant -1.7030 -1.9510* -3.5462 -3.5240 
 (1.0386) (1.0185) (2.6750) (2.6996) 
     
Observations 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 
R-squared 0.8526 0.8561 0.8867 0.8923 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Neighborhood   YES  
Neighborhood by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Table 3.10A 2 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – Domestic Violence 911 Calls by Neighborhood 
Dependent Variable: Domestic 
Violence 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF -0.0188 -0.0205 -0.0233* -0.0237* 
 (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0123) 
Treated Neighborhood 0.1255*** 0.1224*** 0.0887*** 0.0577*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0360) (0.0213) (0.0186) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood -0.1123*** -0.1133*** -0.0919*** -0.0910** 
 (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0298) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Race of Police Victim: White -0.0213 -0.0213 0.0355 0.0348 
 (0.0898) (0.0860) (0.0696) (0.0648) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 0.1081*** 0.1054*** 0.0933*** 0.1012*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0259) (0.0316) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Cause of Death: Gunshot 0.0217 0.0291 -0.0093 -0.0024 
 (0.0414) (0.0391) (0.0258) (0.0301) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed 0.0197 0.0197 0.0058 0.0058 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Percent Female 0.0078** 0.0077** 0.0155*** 0.0155*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Mean Household Income 0.0000** 0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Percent Below Poverty 0.0188*** 0.0188*** 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Constant -0.5862*** -0.6855*** -0.9116*** -0.9095*** 
 (0.1767) (0.1680) (0.2057) (0.2062) 
     
Observations 1,378 1,378 1,378 1,378 
R-squared 0.8084 0.8107 0.8437 0.8483 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Neighborhood   YES  
Neighborhood by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 






Table 3.11 4 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls by Neighborhood 
Dependent Variable: 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF -0.2381 -0.4150 -0.8784** -0.8747** 
 (0.4076) (0.4091) (0.3098) (0.3148) 
Treated Neighborhood 4.0601* 4.0274 0.5469 0.9485** 
 (2.2243) (2.5134) (0.3916) (0.3711) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood -4.7594*** -4.8156*** -1.7484* -1.7205* 
 (1.2226) (1.3053) (0.8671) (0.9286) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x Race 
of Police Victim: White -4.2061 -4.4180 -2.4105 -1.2240 
 (3.8740) (4.7499) (1.5708) (1.5773) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 4.5407*** 4.5197*** 2.1156 2.0935 
 (1.3503) (1.0902) (1.2949) (1.3468) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x Cause 
of Death: Gunshot 4.8558** 4.9873** 1.2000 1.0631 
 (1.8329) (1.7517) (0.7837) (0.8139) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed -0.0802 -0.0789 -0.6493 -0.6493 
 (1.1235) (1.1269) (1.1623) (1.1670) 
Percent Female -0.6283 -0.6283 0.1445 0.1445 
 (0.5737) (0.5745) (0.7419) (0.7449) 
Mean Household Income 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Percent Below Poverty 0.9343*** 0.9341*** 0.6076** 0.6076* 
 (0.2908) (0.2921) (0.2759) (0.2770) 
Constant 27.8475 29.9205 12.7824 12.7447 
 (30.4092) (30.5678) (40.1394) (40.2800) 
     
Observations 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 
R-squared 0.6896 0.6943 0.9052 0.9097 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Neighborhood   YES  
Neighborhood by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 






Table 3.11A 2 Weeks after OIF Diff-in-Diff – 911 Calls by Neighborhood 
Dependent Variable: 911 Calls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Post OIF 0.2733 0.2637* 0.2380* 0.2361* 
 (0.1551) (0.1266) (0.1301) (0.1311) 
Treated Neighborhood 0.5321 0.5261 0.4195*** 0.4762*** 
 (0.3455) (0.3449) (0.0911) (0.0946) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood -1.0354*** -0.9866*** -0.8001*** -0.7847*** 
 (0.2824) (0.2579) (0.1349) (0.1399) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x Race 
of Police Victim: White -1.7375* -1.8573** -0.4630* -0.3652 
 (0.8500) (0.8068) (0.2362) (0.2315) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x 
Gender of Police Victim: Male 1.0581*** 1.1305*** 0.7497*** 0.7480*** 
 (0.2570) (0.2466) (0.2385) (0.2361) 
Post OIF x Treated Neighborhood x Cause 
of Death: Gunshot 0.8013* 0.7207* 0.2894 0.2379 
 (0.3825) (0.3763) (0.1977) (0.2020) 
Zip code-level Controls     
Percent Unemployed -0.0281 -0.0280 -0.2125* -0.2125* 
 (0.1510) (0.1513) (0.1148) (0.1154) 
Percent Female -0.1205 -0.1205 -0.1335** -0.1335** 
 (0.1021) (0.1022) (0.0473) (0.0475) 
Mean Household Income 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Percent Below Poverty 0.1794*** 0.1793*** 0.1619*** 0.1619*** 
 (0.0473) (0.0474) (0.0252) (0.0253) 
Constant 4.6718 5.1975 9.6371*** 9.6278*** 
 (5.2676) (5.2629) (2.2508) (2.2621) 
     
Observations 1,378 1,378 1,378 1,378 
R-squared 0.6854 0.6899 0.8858 0.8893 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  
Neighborhood   YES  
Neighborhood by Year FE    YES 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard Errors 




Source: TN Crime Insight – Domestic Violence Data, 2018. 
Figure 3.1 Domestic Violence Incidents by Offense Type - Tennessee (2018) 
 
  























Note: Data from TN Crime Insight – Domestic Violence/Domestic Situation Data 2001-2017. 






Source: TN Crime Insight – Domestic Violence/Domestic Situation Data 2001-2017. 




Note: Data from Fatalencounters.org, 2000-2019. 
 





























Note: Data from U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2017 ACS 1 – Year Estimates, Demographic 
and Housing Estimates, DP05. 






Note: Data from FOIA 911 Calls for Service – Memphis, TN. 





Note: Data from FOIA 911 Calls for Service – Memphis, TN. 






Note: Data from U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2017 ACS 1 – Year Estimates, Demographic 
and Housing Estimates, DP05. 






Note: Data from U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2017 ACS 1 – Year Estimates, Demographic 
and Housing Estimates, DP05. 
Figure 3.13 Percent of Residents Unemployed – Memphis, TN  
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Note: Data from FOIA 911 Calls for Service – Memphis, TN. 





Source: 2019 Poverty Fact Sheet. Elena Delavega, PhD, MSW, School of Social Work, University of Memphis, & 
Gregory M. Blumenthal, PhD, GMBS Consulting 
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